If that prospect makes you a little uncomfortable, you are intuiting the problem of "pattern identity" vs "continuity identity".
Analogy: impregnating a woman and (eventually) causing her to give birth - that is, "duplicating" her, although the copy is actually not very like her - doesn't give you the right to kill her.
I'm fine with teleportation, if that's what you mean, but I go into that with the intention of the death of one of the copies. It's effective suicide, not externally-imposed murder.
What if one did this regularly? Would battle-hardened cloners become insensitive to "retirement" of their doppelgangers, or as the last survivor of the series of slayings would they start to feel hunted?
Really feels at least a few centuries too early to even gauge whether it is possible to substantially capture (let alone reproduce) the state of a brain. Sure would be disappointing if it turned out you could get 90% of the functionality with a ten-state DFA featuring frowning and pooping, but it would make cryonics a whole lot easier. "Just leave me enough brainstem to get home."
But I take it I am unusual in this.