Intel releases open source blockchain
ibtimes.com
ibtimes.com
The promoters get larger, and the consortiums get larger.
People need to talk about the WHY and HOW their blockchain works better. How it solves problems better than an existing blockchain. This isn't detailed because you already know the answer: "It doesn't, but I couldn't get a pull request to that other open-source repo approved so I made my own" .... "and this time got my managers to approve it too"
But yeah the consensus model sounds interesting.
http://intelledger.github.io/introduction.html
The security model is totally different than Bitcoin - it's based on trusted nodes, leading to much different tradeoffs.
Tradeoffs such as?
I read that and it is hard to conceptualize the pros and cons. Sometimes I think about why blockchains weren't considered as a solution to the byzantine generals problem before 2008. Was it fucking stupid? Was the consensus idea improperly dismissed? Never considered? I would say from 2000 - 2008 internet latency was 'good enough' in some places for this. Maybe 2004 - 2008 the storage space improvements were also good enough.
Sometimes I really wonder.
There are a lot of other interesting things that they could do with SGX, though just from reading the introduction it seems that they didn't attempt any other innovations.
It would be interesting to see Intel open their SGX platform so as for it to be configurable, and use it to attest Tendermint nodes. Accountable BFT consensus benefit from hardware attestation.
"This project includes a consensus algorithm, PoET (Proof of Elapsed Time), which is intended to run in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), such as Intel® Software Guard Extensions (SGX)."
It got me thinking of other ways for computers to prove that a certain amount of time has passed, and I came up with this idea that takes advantage of the finite speed of light:
I've been trying to understand the base of trust in this: I think it's Intel EPID: it boils down to a secret key burned into the hardware and managed by the ME. What happens if Intel's signing machine is exposed?
Either way, whoever controls 50% of the genuine (where "genuine" = "signed by Intel's master key") Intel hardware gets to control consensus, right?
I wonder what the motivation is here. I've long believed that a lot of security issues could be avoided simply by using higher-level languages, but I haven't seen many major security undertaking done in higher-level languages.
I tried out BitMessage I think it was, a while back; I think a stripped-down lightweight version of it would be very useful.
Maybe with a Web browser doing encryption, decryption in-browser (already Tutanota etc. do this). Not sure as to the the other pieces that would need to be deployed.
If you are interested, you can use OpenPGP with ECC ( and the JS implementation https://github.com/Jaxx-io/openpgpjs-secp256k1 )
Take into account that you need to use different keys for signing and encryption and the BIP 44 can be useful for this purpose.
Here's the proof of time disclaimer, which might be considered to be "proof of Intel inside": http://intelledger.github.io/introduction.html?highlight=pro...
And I'd hardly call pointing this out "stirring the pot" or "pointless". This has serious security, openness, and privacy implications that definitely deserve to be mentioned in the discussion for what amounts to a press release.