After the second world war, a lot of asian countries were in ruins. Consider Korea. Before the war, it was a servant of the Japanese empire. Then in the 50s the country got flattened by war, and split in two. The northern half became an Orwellian nightmare. After all this, and under a US security umbrella, the southern half transitioned into a first world economy in less than forty years. Within easy artillery range of the nastiest country on the planet. This is a miracle of our time. It's amazing.
Over the same period, Japan transformed from a brutal empire into a Scandanavian country: innovation economy, doesn't like war, etc.
Similar story in Germany. Another strong western country and US ally. Something similar with Taiwan.
So if the west had been able to affect that kind of positive change on those countries, why not bring the same kind of change to the arab world?
Either we did something different, or something about these countries isn't reacting the same way.
Ethnic divisions make things more complicated. Particularly as the middle eastern dictators have been so good at poisoning the well by playing ethnic groups off against one another. Typical Syrian Christians will hate Assad, but also be terrified at the reprisals that wait for them if he collapses.
In post-war Europe, a lot of that was avoided because nobody powerful minded relocating populations of ethnic Germans to Germany.
It might be better if we'd thought of the middle east as a really nasty version of Yugoslavia, rather than another Asia.
An easier place to start might be to understand why Southern Sudan is failing. This was an opportunity to build a new state from scratch. It has fewer of the usual excuses. Largely Christian country but there is ethnic conflict. The new state is not working. Why? Can we learn anything about that from how we screwed up in the middle east?
Yes--though it's probably cultural/historical identity more broadly. For a European counterpoint to your positive examples, see the Balkans/Yugoslavia. Or the long-term issues in Ireland. In the post WWII era, also see the partition of India.
-- Dick Cheney, 1994 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w75ctsv2oPU)
The shock and awe approach in Iraq allowed huge numbers of soldiers to survive the war without ever really being properly defeated. It is hardly surprising if they switched to an insurgency when the new country offered little in the way of jobs or opportunity.
We need to realise that war is about violence. It is naive to believe you can defeat a country psychologically without defeating them physically first. The West is understandably reluctant to face up to that reality.
1) An overt plan and programme to erase and supplant the then present nationalistic cultures (particularly in Germany and Japan)
2) Military superiority and occupation
3) Gradual economic improvement, due to significant US aid and technical advice (the latter was particularly important for Japan)
The first reason is the most important, and probably the most politically unfeasible now. You have to remember, WWII propaganda was intensely focused on de-humanising the enemy and de-legitimising their ideologies. The public would have been very supportive of efforts to stamp out Japanese and German culture, and 'give the savages' something better.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denazification
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupation_of_Japan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan#Effects_and_lega...
'On September 6, U.S. President Truman approved a document titled "US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan".[10] The document set two main objectives for the occupation: (1) eliminating Japan's war potential and (2) turning Japan into a western style nation with pro-American orientation. Allied (primarily American) forces were set up to supervise the country, and "for eighty months following its surrender in 1945, Japan was at the mercy of an army of occupation, its people subject to foreign military control." At the head of the Occupation administration was General MacArthur who was technically supposed to defer to an advisory council set up by the Allied powers, but in practice did everything himself. As a result, this period was one of significant American influence, having been already identified in 1951, that "for six years the United States has had a free hand to experiment with Japan than any other country in Asia, or indeed in the entire world."'
It should be noted that MacArthur pursued pretty humane and rational policies for the most part. Also, on the technical advice side, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._Edwards_Deming#Work_in_Japa... . You can see the seeds of TQM or the 'Toyota Production System' in Deming's management philosophies.