An Open Letter to President Obama: This Is About Math, Not Politics | Hacker News Reader

An Open Letter to President Obama: This Is About Math, Not Politics

medium.com

21 pointsanishathalye6 comments

> We’ve also seen the ramifications of bad policies that tried to weaken security. In the 1990s, there was a concerted effort by certain outspoken law ...

Dillution of the message by polluting it with political nostalgia is annoying. Make your argument that it's pointless from a mathematical standpoint and help spelling it out, not from some guilt-trip by wrongs of the past.

I'm growing less sympathetic of the "it's impossible" argument against digital backdoors. We've known how to do it for a long time: just add a second signing key to every iPhone, and give it to the government.

Sure, this increases the risk that the key will be stolen by the bad guys. But that's also a problem with good solutions. On the hyper-paranoid end, there's something like the DNSSEC Root Signing Ceremony[1]. On a more practical note, there's whatever Apple does with their current signing keys. After all, those don't seem to have been stolen and used at large so far.

Of course, this is still a terrible idea, mostly because governments are not often working in individuals' best interests. But it's far from "impossible" to meet the requirements being handed down by US.gov with only a reasonable level of risk.

[1]: https://www.cloudflare.com/dnssec/root-signing-ceremony/

> We've known how to do it for a long time: just add a second signing key to every iPhone, and give it to the government. It's far from "impossible" to meet the requirements being handed down by US.gov with a reasonable level of risk.

But that's the whole argument. Everyone knowledgable about encryption knows it's not impossible to hand the government a key, they're claiming it's impossible to do so with a reasonable level of risk.

There's no such thing as a "reasonable level of risk" here. If the government has access, every human on the planet has access, so you might as well just give up on encryption entirely because it's doing nothing of value.

For example, here's what happened when we "just give the government a second signing key" to luggage locks http://www.computerworld.com/article/2983558/security/that-t...

> If the government has access, every human on the planet has access, so you might as well just give up on encryption entirely because it's doing nothing of value.

It's a pretty extreme position to say that you trust Apple to be able to keep secrets better than the FBI/NSA/CIA

> because it's already happened to luggage

I don't think this is actually relevant. This "vulnerability" being introduced by the TSA is completely irrelevant: wants to get into your luggage they can cut it open if they have to. Luggage locks have always protected against the threat model of "some rando rifling through my stuff" not "dedicated attacker who spends time ahead of time making devices to get into the luggage". The TSA doesn't and shouldn't care about people having copies of TSA luggage keys, it pragmatically doesn't change anything.

It's not Apple keeping secrets vs. The FBI/NSA/CIA keeping secrets. It's secrets being kept that Apple willfully lacks the means to access vs. secrets being kept that Apple has been compelled to develop the means to access at the behest of the FBI/NSA/CIA.

Are you're going to vote for Hillary in the general anyway? If so, they're not going to pay any attention to what you want.

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