The Neuroscientist Who Lost Her Mind
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
It is this 'self' that people generally mean when they talk about the soul. We have a hard time giving a metaphysical analysis of what this soul is, but that does not mean it does not exist. As it is, the soul (in this functional sense) provides an explanation for too many things that would otherwise be inexplicable.
We aren't more than our physical brains, at least not when you include the encoded set of experiences in your brain.
1) local 2) realist 3) determinism
has been disproven by Bell's theorem. But I it's still a "pick two" kind of choice.
I, personally think that by Occam's razor, the Everett interpretation ("Many Worlds") makes the most sense, because it's simplest. And actually it retains all of the above three, but it introduces "self-locating uncertainty" (http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7907), which effectively has the same kind of effect from our perspective.
It's a space-time graph (tree?) with a root at the start of time and leaves at infinity.
Determinism does work retrospectively though.
The Zen master replied: "I don’t know.”
The monk said: “What do you mean. Aren’t you a Zen master?”
And the Zen Master replied: “Yes, but I’m not a dead one.”
For example, in the Ethics Spinoza wrote (roughly translated) "eternity cannot be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time". I puzzled over this idea for many years, extending to decades. More recently I've thought it prescient, in a way anticipating the concept of "space-time". Indeed that may not be coincidental given Einstein's statement that he was strongly influenced by Spinoza.
So it's not a surprise, in fact even reassuring that such insights permeate human thought, as the Zen Mind nicely demonstrates.
Edit: grammar
The real goal of Buddhism is the elimination of suffering in oneself and others and is purposefully silent on the 'big questions.'
[i] http://www.faculty.umb.edu/michael_lafargue/104/204/budd/rdn...
By the way, one religion without leaders and without deities is fundamental Taoism. There's no one who can lead you on the path but you.
Machines don't have afterlife. So, enjoy every moment you live right now! :)
[1] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deepak-chopra/stephen-hawkings...
> Einstein had a strong feeling for the presence of awe and wonder at the far horizon of the cosmos and saw evidence for the existence of a unifying, rational presence in the mathematical order of the cosmos. But since then the universe of theoretical physics has become random, complex, paradoxical, and barren of divine presence.
At least the atheist brigade remains constant. That's a comfort.
It appears to me that I am more than my brain. I have a body that I think I can control. If you define "you" as a sequence of states of matter, then the rest of your body should count too.
>So the person you are right now is variable, depending on the state of your brain. So with that has a fundamental fact, who are you really but the state of your brain at the moment?
This feels a bit circular to me.
B: " 'I' am nothing other than my present brain state. Since the entity that robbed the convenience store possessed a different brain state, we cannot be the same person."
Not sure how that would fly. Maybe there is a meaningful concept of personhood that transcends specific brain states?
>Not sure how that would fly
Unless you live in a cave, we're all accountable to many others, employers, loved ones etc, and, finally even to ourselves. After all haven't we all felt embarrassed or ashamed of something we did in a 'prior brain state'.
> Who can examine your actual brain states anyway?
> This sounds like mind police
> Actions are different from brain state
> Are their brain states that shouldn't be allowed?
In a more practical sense, when policing your own thoughts there certainly are thought patterns and by extension brain states that you should avoid because they have negative side-effects. Some examples are OCD, depression etc. For these there are medications and therapies designed to help correct aberrant brain states.
FreedomToCreate's point, as I read it, is that our identity as a person is nothing more than our brain state at the present moment. That is, from moment to moment we are a different person as our brain states change.
If 'I' am nothing more than my brain state at this precise moment, then any previous brain states that preceded this are separate persons. How then can I be held responsible for something "other people" (i.e. my previous brain states) did?
Of course, we could say that the legal and philosophical definitions of 'person' are different, but what purpose is the philosophical definition if not to inform our definitions in other domains like law?
For the sake of the argument, let's assume it is true - there is no metaphysical soul, and all aspects of the self we asdociate with it - memories, character, consciousness, etc... - are the product of electrochemical reactions inside the body. In other words, we are "deterministic" and whatever we do could be perfectly predicted by following the laws of physics.
I think this wouldn't actually devalue the consciousness very much. "Cogito ergo sum" still applies. There still exists a phenomenon called "consciousness" and there still exist entities who can choose an action, given their memories and the impressions of the world they experience.
Technically, yes, humans would be reduced to "mere machines", however machines which are incredibly more complex and nuanced than everything we are capable to build or understand as of now. Also machines who are thinking about themself and have performed all the accomplishments of human history. And I don't think any of this would be going.
The need to consider subjective experiences and well-being wouldn't go either, btw. The need to have a solid ethical foundation and sound morals would be as strong as ever. If anything it could become broader and give more justification for e.g. animal rights. But I can't see anything bad with that.
If a person's brain stops functioning normally, does he become less human? If a dolphin or monkey can demonstrate more intelligent actions than the brain-damaged person, does this make them more human than they are? More worthy of life?
These are the kind of questions they ask in your local philosophy department.
In this view, changing the brain merely changes how we perceive the world, our behavior in it and, thus, how we are perceived by and relate to others. Interestingly, it can also change our sense of our own self in relation to the world.
When you consider disorders like depersonalization and derealization, they seem to be exactly a defect in this sensory system. The nature of who you are hasn't changed, but your sense of who you are has.
Further, pretend that it has arbitrarily large computational resources.
Even if it could completely predict the inputs it receives (modulo quantum mechanics based randomness), would you expect that it's internal model of the world includes some description of consciousness, of an internal experience?
I do not mean, would it have some sort of a model of agents, entities that act in a way that tends to optimize some things or other,
Rather, I specifically mean the internal experience of things, not just being able to predict that people would say that they experience.
I do not think that it would come up with a model of internal experience, And yet, I experience, and so do you.
So, I think an understanding of reality based only on computation about physical objects, is incomplete.
1) I didn't necessarily mean exactly Solomonoff induction, as what I was describing would be for finding a single good description, rather than making good predictions using a weighted combinations of many descriptions.
2)Well, whether they would have experiences is a topic which is of some debate I think. They would behave as if they did, but, would they? If the simulation is run twice concurrently, are the experiences had twice as much? There are all sorts of potential complications with things like computation with secret sharing schemes, and so I don't think the question is really settled.
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My point was that even if something describes what occurs, what particles end up in what configurations, that doesn't seem to be a description of what is experienced, even if it predicts how people will self report their experiences, and give causal explanations for their self reporting of their internal experience.
If her training as a neuroscientist was providing some sort of special insight into her subjective experiences then that would be one thing, but that's never actually the case with these articles, other than intermittently having some basic awareness of what might be going on.
By privileging the experiences of people whose backgrounds don't have any real epistemological relevancy, I feel like these articles epitomize the hegemonic aspects of science, which is troubling on multiple levels.
Metaphors are always a bit tricky, but you might say it's like someone asking a computer hardware engineer how to use software on their computer[1]. Perhaps this experience did give her some new insight, but if so it was more contextual and related specifically to her work, rather than a general insight into human nature. Of course, it is good for people to share these kinds of experiences, but we should ask ourselves why it matters to us that it was a scientist who experienced them.
The special status of science comes directly from the fact that it relies on objective observation and experimentation rather than subjective experience, consensus, or authority. Emphasizing any of the latter three simply because they come from scientists, suggests that we are trying to treat science as a priesthood, rather than addressing it on its own terms. It also means we've given "science", as a social institution, more power than it merits.
As an article designed for an educated but non-scientific audience, it's only nominally about neuroscience, but really about conceptions of self. I think the point of the article is that despite considering herself an expert, she has no particular insight into her own disease. This is intended as a parable for other experts, suggesting that they may be wiser to trust in the collective wisdom of others rather than assuming they understand the world better than others. It's not quite an anti-science article, but it seeks to "cut science down to size", by (correctly) showing that its practitioners are all too fallible and human.
What are the specific ways in which you find it troubling?
That said, what's to say that her experiences (which perhaps highlight the limits of science) are more valid than anyone else's experiences which do the same.
The reason I find it troubling is because it fits into a multi-hundred year paradigm of, say, indigenous people not being believed about their medical knowledge until some white guy flies down to South America and puts his stamp of approval on it. Or, say, some western religious studies scholars flying to Japan and teaching them what their religious beliefs really are, or whatever.
I'm all for experts when they have real expertise and something to add. But what I find troubling is when a supposed lack of credentials is used to systematically invalidate the knowledge and experiences of certain groups of people, especially when those credentials have no actual relevance to the issue(s) at hand.
Basically you need a big institution that can exert quality control over issued statements. Not necessarily a white one.
Sure. There's a lot of false non-indigenous beliefs also. I realize that a lot of the time there is a real value add happening.
But there are research universities down there also that can do the same work. And as often as not the research done up here isn't really any better than the research that's already been done.