Markets are efficient if and only if P = NP

The paper linked to is a low quality imitation of the current literature. Among its flaws it has the common fallacy that if a problem has a large number of states than inspecting all the states is always hard.

I strongly recommend instead some of the interesting actual work on Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria:

"Nash equilibria: Complexity, symmetries, and approximation" Contantinos Daskalakis, Computer Science Review (2009) vol. 3 (2) pp. 87-100

"Computing Correlated Equilibria in Multi-Player Games" Christos H Papadimitriou, (2009).

I felt compelled to download this paper just to see who wrote it.

Phil Maymin http://philmaymin.com/

Assistant Professor of Finance and Risk Engineering at the Polytechnic Institute of New York University Ph.D. in Finance from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business Hedge fund portfolio manager Policy scholar for a free market think tank Award-winning journalist Columnist for the Fairfield County Weekly Columnist for LewRockwell.com Author of Yankee Wake Up and Free Your Inner Yankee