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It isn't as simple as creating the tool, read this blog post that was linked elsewhere in this thread that explains why they can't just create and delete the tool.

http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645

> The data on it may prove useful in preventing future attacks.

The data on it may also not prove useful in preventing future attacks. Especially as it was a person's business (not primary) phone.

The other issue here is that this will only grant safety insofar as terrorists don't do math or encryption themselves - and that could be through an app that they write or a foreign made android phone where they lock the bootloader with their own code signature.

I don't think the FBI can or will hand over the phone, that would compromise their entire investigation.

Besides, once the software exists and is signed by Apple, it's very hard to prove that all copies have been deleted.

It's difficult to imagine this recovery operation could happen if Apple never get access to the phone. Perhaps they could have representatives from both Apple & FBI present.

Proving all copies are gone isn't possible; you can't prove non-existence. Ensuring extreme unlikelihood seems relatively straightforward, though. Make fewer copies, trusted personnel only, isolate the development to a particular location with no network access, etc. Naturally there'll be a risk that a copy survives, just as there's a risk that a contingent of rogue Apple employees are already working on it for the FBI.

The phone belongs to San Bernadino County, and is administered by them. This entire effort is PR intended to set precedent or encourage new legislation.

Tuesday Adi Shamir at the RSA conference said that this is not the right case for this issue and that Apple should help the FBI in this particular case and I completely agree. Apple also has screwed up as well and should admit it. Apple would not even be able to comply with the FBI's request with the proper security architecture. The iPhone should require user authentication before updating the software/firmware. If it had required authentication first, then the FBI would need to enter the pin before installing any software, preventing them from installing this vulnerable version of the software to crack the pin. Then Apple would not be capable of helping the FBI in this way aside from hacking the iPhone. I hope that Apple fixes this problem by requiring user authentication before software updates so they can put this issue to rest. And it looks like they probably are ( http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/25/technology/apple-is-said-t... ) They can then avoid using this technique in the future and avoid putting their signing key at greater risk.

From a security risk standpoint, Apple's arguments are fairly weak. They argue that this binary could potentially be leaked and used on other phones, but this would not be possible if they implement the solution I have already stated. Maybe an adversary could infect an OS with this code using a security vulnerability, but if they can do that then there are worse things they could already do. The best argument I have seen is that doing this will result in Apple trying to comply with requests from the government in bulk, and in doing so create an environment in which Apple signs many copies of this firmware on a much more frequent basis, an environment which would put their signing key at greater risk. Again they would not need to do this in this case if they fixed the authentication problem.

Apple keeps trying to construe this as a backdoor but it isn't really a backdoor. It is a security vulnerability in Apple's security architecture and it is fixable. If Apple keeps pushing the backdoor issue then Congress may legislate on backdoors or the courts may make a decision on them, and likely not in our favor in this case.

This is not the right battlefield for Crypto Wars 2.0. This is a high profile and emotionally driven case with a mass shooting in which much of the public will side with the FBI simply on this fact alone. The phone is the property of the government, the gunman is dead and all of these facts work in the FBI's favor. We should be fighting this on our terms and not the FBI's.

Rep. Sessenbrenner was correct when he told Apple's lawyer during the hearing that "you are not going to like what will come out of Congress on this". If any legislation is passed we will most likely be in a worse situation than we are in now. The best thing Congress could do on this issue is nothing at all. And Apple is pushing them to take action.

Edit: Even if Apple were to require authentication before updating the software it doesn't matter because of the third immutable law of security:If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your computer, it's not your computer anymore. The FBI can still load FBIOS directly into RAM since they have physical access. But this is a much more cumbersome procedure since they need to pull parts off the board and probably need to spin a new PCB and they can't automate it the same way as if they were to do it purely through code.