>The argument is that once they have this precedent in hand, they can then use it to force Apple to alter the code in the secure enclave of all current Apple devices so that the security services can gain access to them on demand.
Sure... if there's a warrant for a specific phone, and that Apple even has a way to update the Secure Enclave (my understanding is that updating the Secure Enclave wipes the contents).
One overreach I could see happening from this precedent is getting Apple to participate in a targeted wiretap: Target brings phone to iStore, Apple "accidentally" wipes Secure Enclave (installing backdoor), and target could now have phone hacked later. Contrived, but I think this would be precedent.
But in no way is this ruling a precedent to push out a backdoor to every iPhone ever made. And the precedent that Apple must help unlock an iPhone has existed for over 100 years I think. Based off of the whole "digital key" == "Physical key" logic of the courts, if Apple didn't want to help exploit the backdoor, a judge could probably rule to force Apple to hand over its actual signing keys for updates. Awful, but the precedent is totally there