Why Apple Is Right to Challenge an Order to Help the F.B.I
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
"Apple had asked the F.B.I. to issue its application for the tool under seal. But the government made it public, prompting Mr. Cook to go into bunker mode to draft a response, according to people privy to the discussions, who spoke on condition of anonymity."
If this is true, it sort-of implies that Apple would have done it, but secretly, and they were forced to take their very public stance because of the FBI's posturing.
Did they think perhaps there would be public outcry the other direction meaning Apple would look like it was harboring terrorist information if they didn't comply to a public request?
Or is that too tinfoil hat ?
This is exactly what is happening. It's a political hail mary to get the easiest-to-see use case of forcing privacy violations on american corporations and users legally protected in court precedent. Of course, under this interpretation, there's the disturbing implication they had to wait this long (after the revelation about PRISM) to find a case that so well matched their political agenda.
It's also a little worrying that they are going public, because normally that's not necessary for court verdicts. Perhaps they're preparing for legislative action if the case fails?
Pro-Privacy: Cruz (R), Paul (R), Sanders (D)
Pro-Surveillance: Trump (R), Rubio (R), Bush (R)
Moderate: Carson (R), Clinton (D)
[0] https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/02/02/where-do-us-pres...
Also, I would put Clinton in the rabidly anti-privacy camp if just for this stance she took after San Bernadino: http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/could-hillary-clinton-s.... She clearly has no desire for privacy from governments except through legal constraints. Furthermore, her understanding of technology as demonstrated by stances on her email servers, on encryption, and on video games, is outweighed by her desire to either (ab)use technology regardless, or attempt to intervene in it. Not great for an executive, which you would hope would be conservative (slow to move) OR knowledgeable OR defer to a strong cabinet.
Off topic, but I am going to make a Hacker News bot that looks for this phrase, waits 1 hour and sees if the comment is still downvoted.
Or, I'm going to write a copy and paste paragraph explaining to people why it appears that a comment has been downvoted. This would include all the mechanics, how karma works in HN, voting algorithms, mod flagging, time passed etc, involved as well as human psychology at play. So, the above phrase either is honest or dishonest.
For example, in this case I would posit that yes, you actually do know why they were being downvoted, but that by writing that you were actually saying "I disagree with the others who downvoted you". There is a difference.
It could be similiar to when people say "I don't know why anyone voted for Bush". They are not expressing ignorance about the reasons, they are saying that they disagree with peoples choices. In this case, it would be dishonest. Unless the person was actually ignorant of others (it is possible), in which case it is honest.
Off-topic, as mentioned.
Edits - I do know why I am being downvoted.
Oh wait...
In the Bush example, someone saying "I don't know why anyone voted for Bush" probably means "I don't really understand why (and with what thought process) anyone voted for Bush after everything we know about the matter."
In the recent GOP town hall, Cruz did not come across as supporting privacy or Apple at all. Rubio took the most measured stance and seemed at least to understand the issue the best. He did not support Apple, but said he understood that breaking into the phone would make it available to all and the government needs to work more closes with SV for a solution. Of course that could just mean PRISM V2.
Bernie has probably the strongest record, being both for net neutrality and against mass surveillance and the patriot act. I'd recommend taking a look through his policies as they are so well thought out in the cases he addresses. He doesn't address everything. On the other side of the fence, Rand Paul was the last sane voice (in terms of privacy), explicitly coming out in favor of net neutrality and strong, backdoor-less encryption.
This is in stark contrast to Clinton—well, just google "clinton privacy" and see the massive number of problems she's had to deal with that demonstrate her technological eagerness seems to outweigh her understanding. She's certainly been an eager advocate of EXACTLY the type of action we're seeing here, arguing that we need backdoors for law enforcement. Marco Rubio has explicitly advocated protecting the existing mass surveillance techniques.
I would be highly surprised if Trump or Cruz were for privacy—the former advocated for special ids, the latter doesn't seem to have a great grasp on technology, much less how to avoid using it to bludgeon people[1].
I very much doubt that any establishment-backed candidates in either of the establishment parties would be willing to make any public statements directly applicable to privacy. They are far more likely to come in soft from the other side, and chat up "tools to combat terrorism and other forms of extremism," while eliding over the implication that organized domestic protest groups like Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wherever, or "Y'All-Qaeda" militiamen would also be targeted, in addition to overseas groups.
I'd rather not elaborate further on anyone specific, as I don't want to shove my political biases down any throats on HN.
It's almost perfect isn't it ? It's prima facie reasonable, there's no immediate privacy violation, Apple - by the looks of it - could comply fairly trivially and failure is sure to lead to attempts to legislate. Don't like the motivation but you have give them points for planning and execution.
The simplest explanation is that the FBI wants a legal precedent more than they want the information on the phone. If they get precedent they can request a "hack" into a phone whenever they feel the need, legally. The worry in this case is the troubling precedent it would set.
https://lawfareblog.com/not-slippery-slope-jump-cliff
Quotation from, Not a Slippery Slope, but a Jump off the Cliff By Nicholas Weaver.
The request to Apple is accurately paraphrased as "Create malcode designed to subvert security protections, with additional forensic protections, customized for a particular target's phone, cryptographically sign that malcode so the target's phone accepts it as legitimate, and run that customized version through the update mechanism". (I speak of malcode in the technical sense of "code designed to subvert a security protection or compromise the device", not in intent.)
The same logic behind what the FBI seeks could just as easily apply to a mandate forcing Microsoft, Google, Apple, and others to push malicious code to a device through automatic updates when the device isn't yet in law enforcement's hand. So the precedent the FBI seeks doesn't represent just "create and install malcode for this device in Law Enforcement possession" but rather "create and install malcode for this device".
Let us assume that the FBI wins in court and gains this precedent. This does indeed solve the "going dark" problem as now the FBI can go to Apple, Cisco, Microsoft, or Google with a warrant and say "push out an update to this target". Once the target's device starts running the FBI's update then encryption no longer matters, even the much stronger security present in the latest Apple devices. So as long as the FBI identifies the target's devices before arrest there is no problem with any encryption. But at what cost?
The FBI will gladly keep sealed its requests that Apple unlock phones in more ambiguous cases, because it would be easy for Apple to publicly refute. But this case is just too good for the people at the FBI who want keys to everyone's data.
Either way it looks horribly like the feds just took away the neutral ground in crypto war 2.0
Whether the regulatory mechanism allows them to create something proof against the regulators, now thats going to be an interesting battle. They are still a US company after all.
They run iButt which is an entirely different matter as far as complying with subpoenas goes, especially when the subject of the subpoena is dead and the subject of an investigation.
What are they going to do? Tell the FBI and a judge that they're refusing to grant them access to unencrypted photos taken by the dead subject of a mass shooting investigation? There's no way they can do that.
It's quite another thing to be forced to develop exploits for hardware that's someone else's property just because you're the manufacturer of that hardware.
https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/cloud-to-butt-plus...
FWIW it doesn't change the submitted text directly, but I edited a spelling error in my comment which changed "iCloud" to "iButt".
There's also a an extension that replaces "God" with "Nicolas Cage" that I recommend :)
Anyway, in a legal battle, you contest every relevant point. The fact that they contested it doesn't mean they would have behaved differently after, except that they wouldn't have had to make a public statement under less than ideal circumstances.
Judges absolutely factor in public opinion to their rulings, especially where they must periodically undergo public votes to retain or dismiss on election day.
"How about we start with FBI mandated remote control gun disablers given that it's guns that killed these people? Oh, you're concerned that someone will figure out how to bypass it, and it won't just be the FBI disabling your gun?
Congratulations. You now understand my position."
A gun won't stop a government from watching your every move by converting every device in your house into a surveillance device and then using "parallel construction" to persecute you if some political apparatchik doesn't like your views or opinions. A gun also won't stop a criminal from emptying your bank account or stealing your identity, attacks that can today steal far more from you than a home invasion. A gun won't stop a stalker from hacking your home devices to secretly record your kids playing, or hacking your e-mail account to spy on you, etc. Encryption on the other hand can stop all these things. Cyber-attacks today are potentially even more damaging than non-violent physical invasion (burglary, etc.).
Not only that, but we are very close (if not already there) to a world where you can kill someone by hacking a device. Self-driving cars, Internet connected buildings, etc., could all be used to conduct a homicide remotely. If, for example, the signing key to a car's firmware were to be leaked, then hackers could remotely flash a person's car to murder them on the highway and make it look like a hardware failure or a freak accident. A government could even do this and have almost no chance of detection. The opportunity for corruption both public and private is fairly large given how clandestinely these kinds of attacks could be conducted.
Crypto is the new "well armed militia" and the new right to personal self-defense.
Crypto is just another weapon in the arsenal.
That it doesn't hurt another, do what thou wilt. Thus gay married farmers should be able to defend their marijuana crops with fully auto AK47s. Marijuana, guns and gay sex don't do bad things to society. Only people can misuse them.
I can't speak for the parent, but I'd imagine s/he has observed a correlation in that the political "right" seems to be more in favor of an encryption backdoor than the "left". The "right" is also unequivocally more enthusiastic in its defense of 2a rights.
To support this notion - at least insofar as being an indicator of public sentiment - I would point to the Republican primary field which has almost unanimously spoken out in opposition of Apple's decision. Their two Democrat counterparts have thus far been more reserved about the matter.
It's more like "the manufacturer of this safe has the ability to reprogram the safe to make it crackable, we should hand them the safe and demand that they reprogram it so we can access it".
There's no such thing as one-off and then it disappears in the world of software. Once it exists in the world it's only a matter of time before everyone has it.
I already wrote a rebuttal of this argument in a different subthread. See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11134257
If you have something to add to that, respond there.
China could steal Apple's key, but it doesn't immediately get them anything. They would also have to build up a completely parallel OS. That would be really expensive.
However, once Apple builds the malicious software, NOW you now have two very clear, very desirable targets.
Do you really think that China, Russia, etc. wouldn't bribe, steal, threaten, kidnap or blackmail their way to getting a copy of those?
The same applies to the source code and key now.
The actual software can be locked to the specific phone, so having it wouldn't help. Only having the source code would help, but having the source of iOS would also be very easy to turn into a backdoored version for anyone with the resources to steal it.
Do you not think China etc are capable of modifying source code?
Edit: sure, modifying source code to change the phone ID is a bit simpler than changing source code to not erase the phone on an incorrect password. But the difference seems orders of magnitude smaller than the "getting source code and Apple private keys" difficulty level.
And while it's certainly possible that someone could figure out what Apple's signing keys are, it's incredibly unlikely given how big the numbers we're dealing with are. Which means, sure, somebody else could modify the source code, but getting it on to devices is an entirely different question.
Based on what I've read of what you've written, it seems like you genuinely believe that software is some magic cure-all that can do anything and everything you want, regardless of the practicality and effort required, and actual known constraints.
They take the udid of the phone, and refuse to run if it doesn't match the udid of the iPhone 5C in question. This was specifically mentioned in the court order.
>And while it's certainly possible that someone could figure out what Apple's signing keys are, it's incredibly unlikely given how big the numbers we're dealing with are. Which means, sure, somebody else could modify the source code, but getting it on to devices is an entirely different question.
You seem to have misunderstood. The threat model is not someone figuring out the key, the threat model is someone stealing the key. And, as I've been saying all along, the attacker needs to steal the key regardless of whether Apple complies with the court order or not. Modifying the source is not enough.
>Based on what I've read of what you've written, it seems like you genuinely believe that software is some magic cure-all that can do anything and everything you want, regardless of the practicality and effort required, and actual known constraints.
I'm not sure what I've written that gives that impression. Which specific known constraint have I suggested software can get around? https://blog.trailofbits.com/2016/02/17/apple-can-comply-wit... makes it sound that it would not be difficult for Apple to comply.
The fact that they would have to write some software or whatever is irrelevant. It's no different than if they already had a button they could press to make the phone hackable.
Having to write software is very different than using existing software. Apple developed their software precisely to prevent situations like this---the backdoor is _undoing_ those developments.
It is that follow on that is the back door. So now Apple is in the position where they have to unlock phones on demand, and not doing so will subject them to fines and imprisonment (you cannot easily appeal an order to do something in a case which it is clear you have the capability to do).
What is worse, if they are forced to comply and develop this capability, and then design the next generation of phone so that they once again don't have a capability to break into it, that case then is even harder. The FBI can sue Apple for intentionally obstructing justice.
Don't be fooled, this isn't a case about one phone and one set of people who have shot a bunch innocent people. This is very much a calculated strategy on the Justice Department's behalf to get back doors into phones and create legal precedents for which they can compel those back doors.
That will force the group that doesn't want back doors to get Congress to create a law that specfically forbids them. And the Justice Dept knows that would be very hard for folks to achieve.
The answer now is no. Companies must provide access to information if they possess it, but that's not the same as writing new software to enable access to information they don't possess.
Once that Rubicon has been crossed, it is unclear what the legal test would be to limit the work that can be requested. If a court can require Apple to write some piece of software, why couldn't it require Apple to write some other piece of software? Or take any other affirmative action that might assist the FBI?
I know this might sound crazy but this is how common law works. Court decisions create precedents, which are often in the form of heuristics for constraining future decisions.
A very famous example is the Supreme Court precedent on abortion: before a fetus is viable, the government does not have a legal basis for considering it to have independent rights. Whether or not one agrees with it, the rule is clear.
Right now the rule is clear for what companies must do under court order. If the FBI succeeds in applying the All Writs Act in this case, that clear rule will be gone. What will take its place?
Edit to add a concrete example:
Apple announces that iOS 10 cannot be broken even by Apple. The FBI goes to court and says that they are tracking known terrorists who are using iPhones. If those terrorists get iOS 10 as announced, the FBI will be impeded. So Apple must alter iOS 10 to ensure that they can deliver retroactive access to phone contents in some way.
This would be the smartphone equivalent to CALEA, which requires network operators to build their networks in a way that permits wiretapping. The big difference is that CALEA was passed by Congress, whereas the FBI would only need a court order for smartphones!
The current request is for Apple to build a special version of their OS which can be loaded onto the suspect's phone. It seems to me that the precent this would create would be for similar actions: providing custom software. The gulf between that and altering the public builds of iOS is vast, and I don't see how the former precent could possibly lead to the latter. In fact, the order in question explicitly states that the software provided by Apple must be tied to the specific iPhone the FBI wants to crack.
The precent of providing custom software for a specific device could very well be dangerous in and of itself. This comment does a good job of discussing the possibilities there:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11120036
In short, the precent set here could very well lead to requiring Apple to turn on suspects' microphones remotely, or loading software that scrapes data as the user uses it. That could certainly be bad. But it's a huge leap from that to somehow preventing Apple from ever building and selling secure systems.
Edit: thinking about this a bit more, here's what I see as the really simple version of it all. The FBI's order is compelling Apple to build something, and the worry is that it sets a precedent for building more. But forcing Apple to build insecure devices in the future is not the same; that would be preventing Apple from building secure software and hardware, not compelling them to build something insecure.
Basically, the FBI can argue that Apple did this before and must keep doing it in the future. Making the device such that they cannot respond to a request could be viewed as going against the court. "I'd love to give you that document again, but now I burn them all so you cannot have them."
Once we permit the FBI to task private companies via court order, there's no way to predict how far that tasking will be permitted to go.
> If the FBI demands that you open a door for them, does that imply you're not allowed to brick up the entrance later on?
The FBI is not demanding that Apple open a door, it is demanding that Apple build a custom software system for them. If the FBI can tell Apple how to build software today, then the FBI can probably tell Apple how to build software tomorrow.
If they do this today, they can probably do it tomorrow, yes. But "this" doesn't mean compromising all iPhone hardware or software. It means building a special copy of the software to attack already insecure hardware and software.
Let's say Apple makes the iPhone 7 completely invulnerable to attack even from Apple. How does this precedent play out? The FBI goes to Apple and says, "Do that thing you did before." Apple replies, "Sorry, but we literally can't do it for this phone." How does the existing precedent cause a problem?
This whole line of argument feels too much like, "The FBI can demand something, this is something, therefore the FBI can demand this." People keep saying there's a connection and I just don't see it. When I ask what it is, people just reiterate that it's there.
Then they request a warrant that requires future iOS versions to permit similar access.
By what argument would Apple fight that warrant? The previous case would have already established that such access is necessary, that Apple can provide it, and that the court has the legal power to force them to.
In terms of the burden on Apple, the staff time burden to write software that will run on 50 million iPhones is no greater than software that will run on one iPhone. Code is code.
In terms of damage to the Apple brand, the FBI has already argued that that should not matter:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/20/business/justice-departmen...
"By what argument would Apple fight that warrant?"
By what argument can Apple use to fight this current demand? They clearly can break into the phone.
Consider more traditional warrants. The police ask for a warrant to search your house. They get that warrant. Then afterwards they ask for another warrant, this time to enter everybody's house. Does the precedent set by the first warrant make a judge likely to grant the second one? I don't think so. Certainly I've never heard of any such warrant being issued by an American court (excluding the ridiculous FISA court, anyway), even though police would surely love to have one, and the precedent of search warrants for individual houses is extremely long standing.
The FBI can (and does) hire locksmiths and safe crackers to get into safes where they believe there is valuable information inside, but they don't compel the manufacturer of the safe to create a capability of bypassing its safeguards, but if they did criminals would seek it out so they could rob those safes, and customers would stop buying that safe because they knew criminals could probably get their hands on the same tools the government could to break into and defeat its countermeasures.
So having the government able to order a safe maker to build a safe that can be broken into, the safe maker loses customers and business because their customers don't want a safe that can be broken into, they want one that protects their valuables from everyone.
Many people equate this to demanding that Apple create a security vulnerability, and I don't get it. The vulnerability is already there. The iPhone 5c is already insecure against an attack by Apple. The government is just ordering Apple to exploit that existing insecurity.
There are compelling problems with that too, but it's not the same as requiring Apple to build something insecure.
If the safe company simply hadn't built in that capability, there would be nothing the FBI could demand of them, because it wouldn't be possible.
Remember the attorney general who molded the torture stance for the bush admin? John Yoo and Alberto Gonzalas? We need to be able to make these people accountable and be removed when they do stuff like this.
Those both are basically war criminals.
I'm not a lawyer, so I don't know if a company has to comply when the FBI demands information for a person. But if they do, this shouldn't be seen as any different.
Why don't we have remote kill switches in cars? Think of the high-speed chases that could be prevented.
Why don't we have surveillance cameras in private homes? Think of all the crimes that could be solved.
Even if these are all off by default, and the law requires a court order to turn them on, Americans would not accept them. Encryption is no different, except that most Americans don't understand it well enough to see the parallels.
But these are just arguments against backdoors.
The even more fundamental argument is about the All Writs Act. Can the FBI require companies to develop new capabilities just with a court order? Shouldn't that require legislation? Why did we bother to pass CALEA, if the government could have just said "All Writs Act" and gotten what they wanted that way?
"Apple ordered by Chinese government to disable lock on phone seized from undercover CIA agent."
The act is the same. Being a multinational company, the result is no different for Apple. A government is legally requiring Apple to make decryption possible, but suddenly the people crying for Apple to unlock this phone will take an extremely different stance.
Basically, not only do I not trust the government but I don't trust that the information won't fall into even worse hands than theirs.
This type of reasoning leads to cognitive dissonance (believing two logically conflicting things at the same time) in the general population, which is caused by people applying double bind[1] arguments to conversations. Those double bind arguments end up creating additional cognitive dissonance in others and the vicious cycle is repeated, all the while being accelerated by our ever increasing connectedness. There's a going theory that these types of meme-based arguments are actually thought viruses[2].
One way to stop these types of arguments is to take a quiet moment and identify arguments or language structure that lean on speculative unknowns and which encourage equally speculative rhetoric which is dissonant in nature. In other words, let's all start to learn how to identify dissonant speech and reject it as a truth when we hear it. Let's tell others we think the conversation may be dissonant in nature to help stop the cycle.
One thing to consider while approaching solving these complex problems is setting the goal of removing rules of conduct as technology becomes more complicated. All this talk of creating new rules (and seeking new rulings to establish them) is creating an extremely complicated house of cards for all of us to thoughtfully manage. This is because we're basing our arguments on a fundamentally false premise, which is it's the government's job is to completely remove all suffering from society. That's actually not their job, nor is it achievable, so perhaps it's time to question why they think it is and figure out a solution that isn't in disagreement with itself.
I'm not attempting a rational argument. I am attempting to phrase the argument in terms that a set of authoritarian advocating individuals can relate to.
To most of them, their guns are more important than preventing terrorists from killing people. By driving home the fact that this precedent will eventually apply to their guns, you get their attention.
Otherwise, they just fluff it off as a "whining from a bunch of liberal, elite pansies".
> Otherwise, they just fluff it off as a "whining from a bunch of liberal, elite pansies".
You can't simulate what you might say and then simulate what they might say and make any of it make any sense (or be reasonably efficient in whatever systems you plug that stupid logic into).
Stop the cycle and solve the real problem. That's all I'm asking: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rE3j_RHkqJc
Otherwise, you just fluff it off as "whining from a bunch of conservative, mouth-breathing gun nuts."
"Law enforcement agencies have a legitimate need for evidence, which is all the more pressing in terrorism cases."
What makes a terrorism case more pressing? How many domestic terrorist attacks have had related followup attacks? How many domestic terrorist cases have been linked to other domestic terrorist attacks? How many domestic terrorist attacks have been carried out by the same set of individuals or groups?
The reality is that domestic terrorist attacks are not common or frequent, there is no urgency in investigating them because they do not lead to followup attacks. They're coordinated events, not a series of related events so there's no pressing urgency?
"Instead of the FBI making this request, how would you feel if the Government of China were asking? or Russia, or Syria? Do you want them to have the ability to read your encrypted data off your iPhone?"
Countries in the ME and India[1] demanded such from RIM/BBM.
[1]http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-07/11/blackberry-in...
After what Snowden has told us, we know with certainty the FBI/NSA/CIA will use this ability on the phones of citizens of other countries, so I think it's safe to assume other countries would do the same.
Under which religious or political umbrage do you reside?
What if you had something on your phone that isn't illegal now, but is tomorrow? (3D printed gun plans, source code that is found to have been published without consent, an ebook on sexual positions that are still illegal depending on which state and county you are standing on??)
15ish years ago, certain states might have pressed charges if you had a dildo in your sock drawer.
What is in your sock drawer?
Another implication is why would a court order grant access to a sock drawer but not a phone. What makes one unlike the other, regarding lawful court approved search warrants.
Very vanilla and mainstream, religiously and politically.
> What if you had something on your phone that isn't illegal now, but is tomorrow?
I'd delete it? But I probably wouldn't have it in the first place, for the reason above.
> 15ish years ago, certain states might have pressed charges if you had a dildo in your sock drawer.
And that would be wrong. But it'd be the law against the dildo in the sock drawer that would be wrong, not the general principle that the government has the right to search your sock drawer so long as it obtains a warrant based on probable cause. That principle has worked pretty damn well for 200+ years and I see no reason to change it now.
So you'd have yourself and people you care about hang out in prison, cheerfully thinking to yourself, "We're only here because the law is wrong."
> worked pretty damn well for 200+ years and I see no reason to change it now.
That hasn't been running on its own automatically. It's been a massive bulwark of principled people maintaining it against attacks. And there are too many examples to count of misleading evidence used to mischaracterize, defame or prejudice opinions against individuals.
Consider our own government's treatment of blacks up to and including now. The government doesn't always know what is right and needs principled citizens to amend it.
Think back to that recent demo of predicting race by zip code. Thank back to predatory loaning practices, the KKK, job interview biases, unequal prison sentencing, racial bias by police, etc. and consider what happens in less-principled countries like Turkey and Germany. If I were of a non-mainstream race, I would want as few people to know as possible and I would want protection from society's baser instincts.
Otherwise, it's too easy for people with an axe to grind to abuse their power by sweeping through, say, all phones and singling out by language those that appear to be used by an ethnic or cultural group who may be prejudged to be a threat.
However, as a German, I find it interesting why you mention Germany as "less-principled". Less-principled than the US? Do you talk about current Germany or about former east Germany or even Nazi Germany?
Of course, there are enough problems here as anywhere else regarding privacy, etc. But I have difficulties seeing current Germany as "less-principled" than the US wrt. privacy, human rights etc.
Just curious what your impression is based on.
http://www.amazon.com/Nazi-Census-Identification-Control-Pol...
In fact, I would strongly push for anyone working with "big data" to read up on this. Just because we can, does not mean we should.
Data does not have a "use this only this way and only for good" button.
However, as multiple sites have opined, this is about setting precedent and the actual data on the phone is secondary.
From a legal perspective, this is no different from asking Apple to circumvent the passcode protection to extract unencrypted data off a device, which Apple has already done many times.
Over three years ago, a newspaper as everyday as USA Today reported "CVS, Walgreens, Kroger, Safeway, Target and Walmart are among major national chains that now include vibrators on store shelves" [1].
IOW Saying the world dildo no longer qualifies as creepy.
[1] http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/wellness/story/20...
And potentially incriminating secrets wrapped in metaphorical socks, apparently.
Probably one of those socks should contain a big machine bolt with a bunch of heavy hex-nuts screwed onto it, so that anyone who comes around to sniff at my socks can get a proper beating (along with the regular intrinsic olfactory penalty for sniffing my socks).
But I feel like you're missing something. The government cops aren't always going to be looking for incriminating evidence or actionable intelligence. They might just be using that as a pretext to look for cash or valuables that they can slip into their own pockets. You kept it a secret, after all, so how would you prove that they stole it? That's just one of the ways in which power corrupts.
People do care about privacy, but the use case varies. However just because you claim not to care, it does not mean that that becomes the minimum standard everyone else has to adhere to.
That's what the court order says.
That being said, you are wrong because if the ability to backdoor these devices is required by us law, that backdoor will be exploited by anyone with the cash for the exploit, which means Syria, China, Russia, or republicans.
It'd be better to remove the encryption entirely from these devices, so at least you're guaranteed of the safety of your data. (I.e., no security)
There is nothing about this device that hasn't already been swept up by mass surveilence programs, which I guess is fine because it's done by our elected government and its for catching terrorists, and not say, abortion providers or clinic bombers.
Right now we assume no one has developed the capability to exploit this weakness. By forcing Apple to develop this capability, the security of everyone's device is compromised. This assumes that Apple is uniquely positioned to develop the exploit, or at least they are the only ones who can do it quickly/cheaply enough to make it worth it.
At the very least, forcing apple to do it publicly demonstrates the feasibility of the exploit to third parties.
Where is there sense of civic responsibility?
There is no way in hell they'd lose $100 in sales for aiding in this investigation. Being melodramatic doesn't help anybody.
I'm sorry, but this strikes me as wrong, if they were not rich, would they not be compelled todo this, or would they not be able to argue against it as visibly? (I personally think the second would be more likely).
Civic responsibility? What is next? Agreeing to some idiots religious views and blocking anyone from seeing nudity?
I am sorry, but they are a company, not an elected group. If they are not breaking a law, well you can take those arguments of civic responsibilities and shout them at a tree for all that it matters.
I am trying to resist the urge to bring up some hyperbolic argument against this, purely as i am so shocked someone on hn would try an argument this rediculous.
Its akin so 'someone think of the children', in my mind, and as baseless as that sort of argument.
I'll be honest, if somehow Apple could sign a software update that merely disabled encryption for phones belonging to actual mass murders and terrorists, and didn't work on the rest of our phones, I'd be supportive. It's just that there's no possible way for such a thing to exist. The best you can do is a software update that works on everyone's phone, in the hands of people who promise to only use it on mass murderers and terrorists. That's far riskier.
Then the EULA police would have the ability to really nail them, like Al Capone for tax evasion.
The only restriction on this law that Apple could claim (aside from legally out-there options like equating writing software to forced speech) is "unreasonable burden," but this is something that almost any of us could hack up in a day given access to Apple's release build system.
In the future, Apple could make a phone that is actually secure. For example, requiring the phone to be unlocked before updating firmware.
In this case we're talking about someone who walked into an office party and killed 14 people. So ya, I think it's in all of our best interests if we see what's on his phone. Just like I think it's in our best interests if we see what was in his house or in his car. Or do you think we should have just locked the front door to his apartment and waited for the movers to come take everything away?
So if your question is "is there ever a case in which compelling Apple to unlock a phone is OK" my answer is "you bet your ass". There is a right way to do this. It involves warrants and transparency (not secret FISA nonsense). It should involve oversight and be an extraordinary step (just as searching someones home is). But if we catch one terrorist on his way to blow up downtown San Francisco, well it'd sure be handy to have a way to know that his buddies are on their way to blow up Seattle too.
Now I know exactly what's coming, because it always comes so I'm just going to head it off now. No I don't support the unlimited power to search peoples phones. No I don't support the idea of implanting remotely exploitable backdoors into phone operating systems to make this process easy for the government. No I'm not a government shill. No I'm not suggesting that we trade liberty for security. And no I'm not arguing that if you have nothing to hide you shouldn't care about privacy.
NOWHERE in my argument did I take any of those positions. I'm arguing that when the technology exists and the circumstances call for it, backed by transparent functions outlined in the constitution, we should be able to get at data that might save actual lives.
I think China, Russia, or Syria should have that same right. I think that if Apple is going to distribute their phones in those countries they should play by whatever rules those countries have. If Apple really doesn't like it, don't cash the checks.
if (deviceUid = 12345) { openBackDoor() }
Cryptographically sign code. Done. We know it's secure and will only work on devicd 12345 because we trust cryptography.
Do you really think Apple would tell the Chinese government to fuck off if the Chinese threatened to ban apple unless Apple opened a single phone. I have ten billion reasons to believe they would do it.
If those countries were using it to crack down on political prisoners then I'd suggest Apple pull out of the market rather than comply.
But generally corporations should not be allowed to pick and choose what laws to follow. If a company doesn't want to subject itself to the authority of a government, don't do business there.
The argument boils down to "if your family members were killed in San Bernardino, you would not support Apple".
The rebuttal is that first we should firearms because that is what the SB shooters used to actually commit the crime. Encryption never directly killed anyone.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_th...
It's a similar, albeit stronger, idea as "probable cause": giving law enforcement a temporary waiver of rights that regular citizens are usually afforded.
Deliberate backdoors can't exist, Apple needs to put the foot down and make that clear.
The FBI wouldn't get a backdoor to all phones. It would literally only work on this one phone.
Or put another way, the backdoor is already there and Apple is being compelled to open it for this phone.
All backdoors are poison. End of story. If the FBI wanted access to the data on the phone they would have it already. But they don't. Probably because the already concluded they were acting alone and not part of a terrorist cell or network and no longer have need of the rest of the information or they really just don't care enough about it.
However they do want to use this case to get precedent for industry to produce new backdoors for them into previously secure-ish systems in the name of "terrorists". This very idea is cancer, a cancer that will spread to other technological systems they feel aren't easy enough for them to tap into whenever they want. A cancer that will spread across the world as it sets a precedent for nation states to force private companies into deliberately weakening the security in their products to please whatever government finds their citizens having access to encyption to be reprehensible.
So no, it's not mis-information.
You and anyone else that thinks this is ok just don't grasp the gravity of the situation.
The FBI isn't asking for Apple to create a backdoor. End of story. They're compelling Apple to open a backdoor that Apple already created. Apple made an insecure system. They can, and I think should fix it, but in this phone at least the back door is there.
So, wait to use a slippery slope argument when it actually becomes applicable. You're so trigger happy to jump on the privacy, precedent setting bandwagon you didn't stop to think what this case actually is.
Basically, as long as you make insecure systems, the government can (by the fourth amendment no less) demand you let them in if they have probable cause and a warrant. If you make something impossible to get into, and the government starts demanding you stop making devices like that, then we have a problem. But this particular case doesn't get us any closer to that outcome. Not even symbolically.
I think you and everyone else overreacting to this case grasps gravity that isn't there. You're tilting at windmills.
Say the year is 2000 and the US government has a subpoena to access the phone because they want to collect evidence to prosecute a homosexual couple for having consensual sex (which back in 2000 was illegal in some states). The reasoning behind the subpoena matters, and 'OMG TERRORIST' has been so abused that I take issue with it by default.
There was nothing illegal in my example. Maybe now it would be after Lawrence v. Texas, but not before. Saying one should support the law because it is the law is supporting the tyranny of the law.
The other option is to make security that even Apple can't circumvent. They might have achieved this with their newer phones, but it has now become clear that they did not with the iPhone 5C.
From reading the article this is how Apple has helped law enforcement previously.
Now in more up to date versions of iOS the passcode limits access to using the phone, in addition to limiting access to the data contained inside. This limits what Apple can do to help law enforcement in the previous scenario, since any data they could copy off the phone would still be encrypted.
That software doesn't contain a backdoor, but the fact that a new software load could be created and installed could be viewed as the backdoor itself. But if that software doesn't currently exist, is the mere potential of it a backdoor? Somewhat of a philosophical question.
If Apple prevails and doesn't write the software the FBI is demanding, then the backdoor is not there.
The later iPhones with the Secure Enclave may truly be unbreakable if they protect their secrets with hardware in the chip.
But my understanding of it is that Apple is NOT capable of unlocking the phone right now. The FBI is demanding that they develop that capability. So I guess they're capable of being capable...
† At the risk of being an armchair SE expert...
Such a key exists, and it is whatever key Apple uses to sign the iOS updates. Only Apple can sign a new iOS release, so only Apple can update the code to remove all security features. This looks a lot like a backdoor to me, just that the implementation hasn't been written. But all you really would need, in theory, is the signing key.
I would guess that that passcode encrypts the phone, which is why they can't decrypt it.
There's probably more to it (otherwise, they could copy the encrypted data elsewhere to bruteforce it, in which case it would all be a show from the FBI and their real target is other phones).
I'll agree that the ability to update the firmware without the phone being unlocked is poor design on Apple's part. Given the security flaws they've had in the past, this one seems genuine.
At root of it is that even with a flash memory image, brute-forcing AES-256 is impossible. And the key is key fused into the processor and no software or firmware can read it directly.
That it might take some expertise and effort is not really relevant - some is required in any case even if the firmware already existed, so its just a matter of scale. For example I know several people who could not update a phone firmware without supervision, and probably some who could at a stretch (given massive time and resources) reverse engineer it. Apple firmly occupy the sweet spot in this range, they have the secret knowledge that would otherwise have to be reproduced and it would be a bit of effort to build on this but not huge. Changing a bit of code [to remove the delay] and rebuilding a binary image is not a complicated task for their engineers, it is likely something they do all the time.
Personally, I think they should just do it if they are legally compelled to do so. They have done in the past and this is an older device and in 5 years the issue will be moot, as any firmware they create now would be useless.
If they do it now, they the point will indeed be moot in 5 years, not because of technology, but because it will be required of them to make sure they can do this to ALL iPhones.
> legally compelled to do so. They have done in the past and
> this is an older device and in 5 years the issue will be
> moot, as any firmware they create now would be useless.
If they lose this lawsuit they will be forced again and again to build backdoors into their own systems. It's a very unreasonable request that does not find the right balance and the reasons are laid out eloquently in Apple's letter.
Does this count as a "backdoor"? It's built into the way signed updates work. Nobody stole Sony's master signing key for the PS4, even when their entire network was pwned. They're probably stored offline in specialized hardware.
(as I understand it, newer iPhones use crypto magic + special hardware to make it arguably impossible to update the phone while it's locked, so they're more secure against Evil Updates, even ones signed by Apple)
Theoretically yes,a lone wolf plus the FBI could do it, but they would need to get the software they make signed by Apple or steal the key to make it appear so, which would not be simple.
The big issue is that once it is signed by Apple, it could then be used to crack any phone it was installed on as a trusted update, which it is because it was signed.
Yes.
So.. we should think about that and make it so that the keys are stored in a box which cannot be broken into. I think Apple have been working on this, but it is not clear that they are yet successful.
The more I've heard about this the more it seems like cynical grandstanding for marketing purposes: Apple don't want regular people fiction to become "Apple can always unlock your phone".
Why would it only work for that model of phone? Why would iOS vary its repeated attempt lock out code between models?
Also another issue is that Apple are questioning whether this warrant was ever legal to exist.
I am currently with FBI on this because their success could spell doom on the walled garden approach.
The pin is so short (4 or 6 digits) that if you can remove the 10 tries limitation and time escalation (Apple can with a new firmware) it's a matter of time to hack the phone (22 hours. 80ms [1] per attempt * 10^6 pins). It seems a farce to me that Apple says that they can't decrypt it (or maybe they never said that?). With a stronger pw it would be a different story though.
Am I wrong in any assumption?
[1] http://arstechnica.com/apple/2016/02/encryption-isnt-at-stak...
the takeaway is that you should use a much more complex password.
edit: I was calculating on the assumption that you can only use numbers as a pin
If this legal precedent gets set that the FBI can force US tech companies to break into their own customers' encrypted data, you can bet the industry will lose millions if not billions of dollars worldwide in tainted reputation.
Who's going to buy US companies' devices that claim privacy via encryption if they're easily backdoored at the FBI's request?
Forget about customer buying power, courts in europe are using the US's laws to show how EU organisations can't legally use US companies for many things.
Your example would have to include a situation in which the FBI makes copies of the keys to the house, copies of the hard-drives, etc. Then inevitably makes it embarrassingly easy for other parties to get access to those as well, permanently reducing your net security to almost zilch regardless of the outcome of the context and warrant.
And worse, in the process of gaining access to that one house and hard-drive, they simultaneously gain the potential to access millions of homes and hard-drives that have nothing to do with the warrant, and then those millions of houses and hard-drives see their net security reduced to essentially nothing.
If you have an argument, stick with it.
If Apple doesn't want to look bad complying to FBI requests, they shouldn't have put a backdoor in their software.
Whether they force Apple to also do the brute force themselves, or the FBI does the brute force, is not really the important part.
In other words, if some other party got the modified software, it wouldn't do anything. The software was asked to be device locked, which is trivial to do.
The reduced security you worry about already happened on the iPhone.
It's also theoretically possible for hackers to steal Apple's private key from their servers, in the exact same way. As far as I see, there's no change to the threat model by Apple making a new software version, and signing it using the same process they use to sign other versions of iOS. It's useless if not signed, so the real worry is someone having the ability to sign it, and that applies exactly the same if Apple signs iOS or FBiOS.
This suggests the authors don't understand the technology well enough to know this.
edit: this is assuming the software is locked to a specific device. So the signing doesn't matter to any other device. If the software worked on all devices, then a leak of a signed version would be problematic. Although even if they couldn't lock it to device, they could make it only work for a short time, say a week, so if that signed version leaks later it would have no effects (I'm not sure if you can change the clock on a phone without unlocking it though).
How many millions of dollars in engineering salaries will this take? Project management? They're demanding an entire blackhat division of Apple be spun up, with the goal of circumventing other teams security effort.
The FBI or NSA could probably create their own software if they had the keys and source code.
I doubt the cost to Apple is over 100 man hours. But if it's too difficult, they can argue that and simply hand over the source code.
This isn't some Node.js box that a junior developer will monkey patch in prod—this is serious cryptography @ a large company w/processes.
"simply hand over the source code" Ohhh, so you're arguing a private company should hand over all of it's private property (it's source code) to a public institution because... terrorists?! Then Samsung starts hiring more FBI agents for some reason... or the source to the iPhone magically shows up online. Also how many hundreds of thousands of hours of engineering time will it take to sanitize that codebase to make sure it's suitable for public dissemination?
They used to do something similar with unencrypted devices, according to https://blog.trailofbits.com/2016/02/17/apple-can-comply-wit...
>Ohhh, so you're arguing a private company should hand over all of it's private property (it's source code) to a public institution because... terrorists?!
I'm not arguing that. I'm arguing that if Apple claims it's too hard to comply, there's a much easier method. It's to Apple's benefit that they're given the option to make the software and sign it themselves.
This isn't my original argument, I took it from http://bloombergview.com/articles/2016-02-17/the-apple-fight...
You'd be talking about creating both a special version of the OS and updating the SHSH servers to accept that code signature.
What are they gonna do, just hardcode the device's UDID in a sub-routine and distribute it to the entire cluster? What about testing? If they do it wrong and the SHSH blob/update gets in a bad state, they could end up accidentally wiping the phone... so now QE needs to get involved + build test cases.
I'd just spitball a 20 person team with at least nine months, lots of meetings w/leadership/pm/and VPs, hardware being purchased, and several executives having to get involved.
Hell, it takes more than 100 engineering hours at my company just to update some chef cookbooks; let alone schedule a release and get sign off.
I'm guessing you haven't worked at a large company before?
----
They probably did something very different than custom firmware before.
>If they do it wrong and the SHSH blob/update gets in a bad state, they could end up accidentally wiping the phone
How many hours does it take to test on a spare phone? 5?
>I'm guessing you haven't worked at a large company before?
No. But this isn't something that's being rolled out to millions of users. The team doesn't need to do anything that affects other users. They can have their own SHSH server offline, and sign everything offline.
In this case the cracking capability is for a locked phone in FBI possession. Let's assume the same technique isn't possible on newer phones. So what about the next case where the FBI wants remote access over LTE while the phone is unlocked / in use by the suspect?
If you can use All Writs Act to compel Apple to develop the first backdoor, then surely the same is true for the second.
Besides, if this particular information is that valuable, they would have no problem paying for it.
Which brings us back to: it isn't the device they want cracked, but governmental oversight of (civilian) encryption.
So they can't just attempt to brute force the encrypted data, as the encryption key would be 256 bits or more rather than just a 4 or 6-digit numeric passcode. That's why they want Apple to open the OS up to brute force passcode attempts.
Edit: there's no secure enclave chip on the phone in question, but it seems that iOS 8 and later encrypt the user data with a separate private key combined with the user passcode.
The password is tangled with the UID burned into the device at its creation, creating the 'passcode key' that secures the phone[0].
If extracting the UID is somehow possible, it doesn't sound impossible to try all 10,000 combinations (assuming the a 4-digit passcode is used) offline, on different software.
[0] - http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/10/why-cant-app...
There's also another possibility, albeit less likely, that the FBI know they'll lose but they don't care because they can already read the device and they want any terrorists to believe they don't have the information on it. That's a pretty full-on "tinfoil hat theory" though.
I'm not into conspiracy theories, but I'm wondering on this one.
Why would the FBI, or Apple make this so public? The Apple letter seemed staged?
The federal government always seems to get what it wants in the end, especially if one has a lot to lose?
I imagine the conversation starts off with an indignant, appalled CEO.
"Hell No--I'm not giving you access to my customers data!"
Federal government counters with, "Do you want us to scrutinize your past, and present life?"
"Do you want us to look at every stock trade you ever made?"
"Do you want us to publicize the personal information we have on you already?
"You know we can make your life misserable? You know we can make your companies life misserable?"
No this isn't Russia, but our law enforcement branch of the federal government scares me, and I'm a nobody. There's been some deaths, especially in tech, that seem suspicious. The drug overdoses--guy in San Francisco that was about to give a talk on ATM hacking comes to mind.
That tech guy who died in that fiery car crash on Los Angeles.
(I don't want to argue with anyone. I have no evidence. Just a weird feeling. And yes, Tim Cook seems like a choir boy. He comes across as someone who doesn't even jay walk.)
So many slippery slopes.
I am not a native English speaker. Why "it comply" and not "it complies"?
From the Wikipedia article on English subjunctive: "The distinction between present and past is one of tense; the distinction between indicative and subjunctive is one of mood."
The original is not very wrong though - I don't think most native English people would even notice.
Read it with the word "should" or "shall" implied.
"ruling requiring that it should comply"
What happens when an entire nation threatens us ?
- Doesn't an iPhone become completely secure if you prevent if from passively polling for OS updates. If the iPhone would only poll and install updates after user un-locks and allows, then there would be no way change the necessary software configuration without breaking the encryption. And the encryption can't be broken, thus if you could chose OS -level default "don't accept or even check for any updates without user permnission" you really would have an unbreakable device. But if they ever did implement this, it would be terrible for Apple's forced upgrades and their platform would fragment into many incompatible versions. I think everyone knows which option Apple will chose between: CompletelySecurePhoneOS or AbilityToForceUpgradesAndPatches.
- Correct me if I'm wrong but didn't Tim Cook initially state cracking this phone was impossible according to Apple's experts? And now it seems it's a quite reasonable issue of Apple signing an OS-update specific to this device's unique ID; so quite feasible. So was that a lie?
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/after-nsa-backdoors-se...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG
http://www.cnet.com/news/spy-fears-lead-nuke-lab-to-dump-gea...
Who is to say that other state actors haven't done the same to chips produced by their companies? The truth is, the genie is out of the bottle.
A year and a half ago, I wrote a serious article on this: http://magarshak.com/blog/?p=169
It's not good timing....
http://reason.com/archives/2016/02/16/antonin-scalia-was-a-g...
The 4th amendments and all writs law is being broadly interpreted by this judge to give the government the power to effectively enforce a warrant against the entire population of the United States that uses iPhones. Scalia would have been all over that like white on rice.
Check out this article for more information. It also explains how the fact that the phone is a 5C is significant to the encryption scheme. [0] http://blog.trailofbits.com/2016/02/17/apple-can-comply-with...
Could the chip also not be cloned?
If you thought you had a claim I guess you could sue to block the order, but that's up to the courts to decide and that would take precedence over an eula.
It's one thing if you use it as a starting point for discourse, it's another when you use it to beat down the opposition with what amounts to childish antics dressed up in a suit and tie.
This is a common (and completely understandable) misunderstanding of the relevant paragraph:
"Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. ...
The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor. ...
The government suggests this tool could only be used once, on one phone. But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique could be used over and over again, on any number of devices. ..." [0]
Notice how the first sentence of the last paragraph talks about "this tool". "The tool" is the specific version of iOS that the FBI wants Apple to make that would only run on the phone that it wants to unlock.
Notice how the third sentence talks about "the technique". The change in terminology isn't accidental. "The technique" is "the act of demonstrating that Apple can create (and can be ordered to create) a backdoored version of iOS that bypasses tamper protection features of iOS".
The particular software that Apple would create can surely trivially be restricted to run on only a single iPhone. Unless there's a way to make iPhones run unsigned OS code without wiping the device, the only way that the image that Apple provides the FBI could be modified to run on a different iPhone is if someone got a hold of Apple's code signing keys. [1]
The problem to which Cook refers to is -therefore- not that there's a risk that someone might steal the image Apple provides to the FBI and use it to pwn more phones... it's that the government will do as it always does and keep coming back over and over and over again, demanding that Apple produce yet another image that unlocks yet another single phone of interest, regardless of whether or not they expect that the data on that phone will be particularly crucial to their case.
I expect that this would be disastrous for Apple's reputation. It certainly would not be good for society as a whole.
On the one hand, I can see how denying the government's request would be good for the industry and society. On the other hand, if the courts ultimately asserted that the FBI's request is legal and proper, it might spur Apple (and other similar companies) to ensure that the parts of their devices that handle device encryption and unlocking were not upgradable by any means... making generation of software to bypass features of those parts next to impossible.
OTOH, such an assertion would leave software-only privacy software (like Signal, GPG, WhatsApp, et. al.) in a really bad spot.
[0] http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/
[1] If someone gets Apple's code signing keys, many people are going to have many bad days.
> A law enforcement source in the San Francisco Bay Area has confirmed to CNET that Apple has for at least three years helped police to bypass the lock code, typically four digits long, on iPhones seized during criminal investigations.
http://www.cnet.com/news/how-apple-and-google-help-police-by...
But isn't the procedure already pretty straightforward and well known?
1) Make a build of iOS which has the pin timeout feature disabled.
2) Sign that with Apple's private key.
3) Flash onto the iPhone.
That's more or less it, right?
What's keeping the general public safe isn't some sort of secret or obscure procedure. The general public's safety is in Apple keeping that private key private. And the FBI isn't asking for their private key, they're just asking that Apple use it in private, just like they normally do when they push out normal updates.
Am I missing something?
This must be weasel-word day. The FBI is asking for patch, hypothetically just for this phone. But only in this post have I seen anyone imagine "a way that can not be reused" since the point raised stated by the parent article is that such a patch could inherently be reused.
This would require a new OS to be installed in a way that bypasses what I imagine are merely software blocks to installing OSes (it sounds like if they have possession of the device, they can install the OS to it).
This is a technique and a technique can certainly be replicated. Only problem is next time, Apple can't say, "this is an unprecedented step, and very burden-some," which actually turns out to be a legal basis.
This isn't them taking a stand in some sort of NSA spying case, as much as Apple fanboys seem to think that's what's happening here. They're refusing to lift a finger in an investigation of mass murder.
Kinda makes ya wonder what all that moneys spent on...
There's also the issue that Apple software is closed-source. But that's presumably less problematic.
The county has longstanding email and Internet use policies that state, “NO USER SHOULD HAVE AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY” - http://ktla.com/2016/02/18/why-didnt-san-bernardino-county-o...
Each data-extraction request was carefully vetted by Apple’s
lawyers. Of those deemed legitimate, Apple in recent years
required that law enforcement officials physically travel with
the gadget to the company’s headquarters, where a trusted Apple
engineer would work on the phones inside Faraday bags, which
block wireless signals, during the process of data extraction.
My views on the general encryption controversy are:
1. Everyone must be free to make their technology as secure as they possibly can. There can be no mandated weakening of security, back-doors, or other requirements to make the information more easily accessible by law enforcement. On newer iPhones, Apple has patched up the flaw that the FBI wants their help with exploiting. They must continue to be allowed to do that.
2. The government must be able to demand, with a court order predicated on probable cause, that companies provide any and all information that they have that could be useful in circumventing their security features. This can be everything from technical specifications and threat-model analyses, to lists of unpatched vulnerabilities and code-signing keys.
3. It seems to me that American companies have a moral obligation that goes beyond the legal obligations in point #2. They should be actively assisting the government in recovering information, especially when concerning issues of national security. In extreme circumstances, like total war, this should definitely be legally mandated. I'm undecided as to what the policy should be generally. On a practical level, it's probably not feasible for the government to, e.g. start hacking around the iOS codebase themselves, so just information might not be enough.
I'm not too troubled by this court order, especially given the particular circumstances. The right to make products as secure as you can, even from yourself and the government, is what's really important to defend. Trying to argue that the tech industry shouldn't help, even in this case, is not only the wrong position in my book, but a sure way to lose the bigger debate.
Apple's definition of "backdoor" is highly suspect. A backdoor is if I ship my product with an intentional vulnerability, so that I can hack into it later. Apple's not being forced to add a backdoor, it already exists because the security features break down against an adversary that has Apple's private key, at least for the default 4-digit PIN configuration. Now the government is asking them to use their own capabilities to help hack this phone. Of course, Apple didn't create this backdoor for malicious reasons, they just didn't include themselves in the threat-model, greatly simplifying updates and other security features, and allowing the walled-gardenness of iOS. It's also central to the walled-garden. Curiously, this is in direct contradiction to their claim for some time now, that they were designing iPhones such that they themselves can't break into them.
Now put yourself in a Congressman's shoes. The FBI has been telling you for years that tech companies are being purposefully antagonistic to their legitimate search and seizure authority. That the tech companies are purposefully designing features with the sole intention of shutting the government out. Now here's a case where there was no mandated backdoor, the government was able to devise an exploit method, and they got a court order from a judge to make Apple use it on a dead terrorist's phone. "Mandatory backdoors would hurt everyone's security", one of the arguments that we've been winning with, now sounds like a bullshit cover for "we are against any government surveillance". Can you smell the legislation coming yet?
Disclaimer: These are obviously my own personal views and nothing else. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions, policies, or practices of anyone but myself.
(Reposted from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11131456 with additional)
Why would any company have a moral obligation? In fact, what if they are saying this is their moral obligation? To not bypass the security they told customers they had put in place?
I think they by using the term moral obligation, people are trying to negate the meeds for laws or rulings.
In my opinion: There are no moral obligations for companies, just laws they have to follow.
After it is made law, it is the companies choice to do business there or not.
The reason why I consider the hypothesis unlikely is not because those involved are unwilling to deceive, but because they are unlikely to have sufficient skill to make the attempt and avoid detection. I believe that, considering the number of people that would be necessary, at least one Apple insider with ethical concerns would leak evidence that would expose the true story.