Jepsen: RethinkDB 2.2.3 reconfiguration | Hacker News Reader

Jepsen: RethinkDB 2.2.3 reconfiguration

aphyr.com

167 pointsemidln13 comments

Slava @ RethinkDB here.

It's been a pleasure working with Kyle on doing an exhaustive analysis of RethinkDB and tracking down bugs revealed in the second test. Our lead engineer wrote a detailed analysis of our findings (linked from the blog post, but I wanted to link it again): https://github.com/rethinkdb/rethinkdb/issues/5289#issuecomm.... For anyone interested in the details, this is a good read!

As someone employed in building complex systems, I appreciate the takeaways listed during the discussion:

    RethinkDB’s engineers noted three takeaways from tracking
    down this bug. First, fuzz-testing—at both the functional
    and integration-test level, can be a powerful tool for
    verifying systems with complex order dependence. Second,
    runtime invariant assertions were key in identifying the
    underlying cause. A test like Jepsen can tell you that the
    cluster can exhibit split-brain behavior, but can’t tell
    you anything about why. The error messages from those
    leader and log order assertions were key hints in tracking
    down the bug. Rethink plans to introduce additional runtime
    assertions to help identify future problems. Finally, they
    plan to devote more attention to issues which suggest—even
    tangentially—consistency errors.

It is very encouraging for myself, CTO of a company that uses RethinkDB, to see the efforts that RethinkDB go to ensure quality in their product and the willingness to allow Aphyr to potentially uncover problems lurking under the surface.

Thanks again to Aphyr and the team at RethinkDB for going to such lengths to discover, document and fix such failure conditions. Going to have to read through this thoroughly tonight.

Compose released RethinkDB 2.2.4 today. https://www.compose.io/articles/rethinkdb-2-2-4-available/

Fantastic work on this. Seriously, I LOVE RethinkDB. I've used it for my last three projects, and it's exactly what I've been waiting for, blending a relational database with nosql one. So glad this is getting exhaustively reviewed for quality purposes.

Whoaaaa. Membership is where things get nasty, this is awesome. Punting on dynamic membership due to it's extreme difficulty to get right is usually a good idea for many projects.

I'm still struggling to understand what happens in a RethinkDB "reconfigure", especially around this epoch timestamp. Where does the wall-clock time come from, the raft leader of the shard?[0] I also need to read more and understand these value's necessity over any other generation id/sequence number type thing, I'm not sure I follow why they are used given the linked bug report[1]

Also, after embarrassing myself earlier in the week[2], I'm trying my best to read every link in a post before making absurd claims. It's my much deserved penance. It seems there is one link that is broken in the post that I was curious to see due to my ignorance around Rethink's epoch timestamp stuff[3].

[0]: https://github.com/rethinkdb/rethinkdb/blob/a90bb08051603621...

[1]: https://github.com/rethinkdb/rethinkdb/issues/5289#issuecomm...

[2]: https://lobste.rs/s/cnthlp/the_verification_of_a_distributed...

[3]: https://aphyr.com/data/posts/330/link

A new epoch timestamp is generated when you either first create a new table, or when you use the "emergency repair" operation to manually recover from a dead Raft cluster (usually one that has lost a majority of servers).

The wall-clock time comes from the server that processes that query.

Whenever the epoch timestamp changes, replicas will get a fresh set of Raft member IDs, and it's expected that they start with an empty Raft log.

Where exactly the epoch timestamps come from is not really relevant to this bug. With the bug fixed, any given node will only accept multi_table_manager_t actions that have a strictly larger epoch timestamp than what they have right now. That is enough to guarantee that they never go back to a previous configuration, and never rejoin a Raft cluster with the old member ID, but a wiped Raft log.

I guess I'm just confused how this clock becomes a trusted source of truth for forward progress? Is there a way of asserting that the clock makes forward progress that I don't understand?

EDIT: Or is it that it's not required to show forward progress? Still reading the rethinkdb source & docs, thanks for the information so far.

During normal operation, RethinkDB uses the standard Raft protocol for managing configuration operations. The Raft protocol only uses the clock for heartbeats and election timeouts. So we're not using the clock as a trusted source of truth.

However, a Raft cluster will get stuck if half or more of the members are permanently lost. RethinkDB offers a manual recovery mechanism called "emergency repair" in this case. When the administrator executes an emergency repair, RethinkDB discards the old Raft cluster and starts a completely new Raft cluster, with an empty log and so on. However, some servers might not find out about the emergency repair operation immediately. So we would end up with some servers that were in the new Raft cluster and some that were still in the old Raft cluster. We want the ones in the old Raft cluster to discard their old Raft metadata and join the new Raft cluster.

The process of having those servers join the new Raft cluster is managed using the epoch_t struct. An epoch_t is a unique identifier for a Raft cluster. It contains a wall-clock timestamp and a random UUID. When the user runs an emergency repair, the wall-clock time is initialized to max(current_time(), prev_epoch.timestamp+1). When two servers detect that they are in different Raft clusters, the one that has the lower epoch timestamp discards its data and joins the other one's Raft cluster. The UUID is used for tiebreaking in the unlikely event that the timestamps are the same.

So the clock isn't being used as a trusted source of truth; it's being used as part of a quick-and-dirty emergency repair mechanism for the case where the Raft cluster is permanently broken. The emergency repair mechanism isn't guaranteed to preserve any consistency invariants (as the documentation clearly warns).

Ahh ok! An interesting approach. For some reason I'm uncomfortable with it but I need to spend more time reasoning about what failure mode rethinkdb uses care about.

I'm still not sure I fully understand the cases where this could occur, as I'm used to a very different approach to consistent operations that depends highly on physical infrastructure.

What fantastic write-ups. Thanks to aphyr for all the hard work, it's an invaluable service to the community.

That was a beautiful and thoroughly enjoyable read, actually of the level where moderately technical decision makers can start understanding the underlying complexity of maintaining trustworthy distributed systems (and the lengths to which one needs to go in order to truly start trusting something). Just because you implement raft doesn't necessarily mean leadership is always guaranteed under all circumstances - there are always considerations influencing the system, and all parts are intertwined :)

Rethink has been my gotodb since last year. Absolute love it. Just waiting for your windows release.

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