All password managers store plain text passwords. That's literally a requirement for them to work at all.
Chrome encrypts the password in the SQLite database[0] using Windows' CryptProtectData() API, and Firefox encrypts the passwords either using your master password, or if none is set then it encrypts but stores the encryption key in the key3.db.
> Don't rely on them to keep passwords safe.
You've presented no justification for that. If you're using a root compromised machine then no password manager is safe. If your machine is secure then your passwords are secure in both Chrome and Firefox, but more secure in Chrome.
[0] http://www.howtogeek.com/70146/how-secure-are-your-saved-chr...
I'm not sure this is what you mean to say, because, obviously, good password managers don't store passwords in cleartext.
So when people complain about password managers storing plain text (as opposed to hashing) they're barking up the wrong tree, it is a necessary evil.
You just want to see them encrypt those plain text passwords so that offline recovery is harder. That's what both Firefox's master password, CryptProtectData() for Chrome/IE, and the key-chain in OS X provide.
> Chrome encrypts the password in the SQLite database[0] using Windows' CryptProtectData() API
If its encrypted, then its not plaintext. Its ciphertext. In infosec lingo plaintext specifically refers to the unencrypted and otherwise unaltered original information.
A couple of years ago, chrome joined safari in using the OSX KeyChain. (On Ubuntu, Chrome can also use the gnome-keyring)