How brain architecture relates to consciousness and abstract thought
kurzweilai.net
kurzweilai.net
He even did extensive biological experiments to demonstrate that these concepts are valid interpretations of organic biological phenomena and thus reasonably extendable into the domain of cognitive development. It's a shame his work was reduced to the "stages" theory, which really doesn't do justice to his work as a whole.
Consciousness is mentioned only once:
>Our current data-driven results holistically demonstrated expanding amalgamation of function [sic!] over structural depth [...]
>Fascinatingly, results suggest why the insular and opercular regions are some of the best candidates for awareness or consciousness [62] [63] or why parts of frontal cortex are involved in higher cognition.
Wait, why is function uncountable?
>These conclusions are elaborated here:
>Sensory regions closest to inputs (bin1) in our hierarchy [include Insula and opercular]
>[...] hypothesized to play a role in multi-sensory integration and interoceptive awareness,
>[...] since it is the hub of the senses
>[...] the coordinating role awareness plays in cognition
>Further, middle regions, intermediate in distance from all sensory inputs (bin5) included hippocampus and MTL known for memory and celebrity neurons
>Deep regions less connected to and farthest from inputs (bin10) [...] may support more abstract cognitive functions.
Aren't the first two quotes contradicting? Surely, awareness or consciousness is an amalgamation of function and distributed.
I'd rather thought the hippocampus was deemed central to cognition, as memory seems essential for re-cognition. Self-awareness is deemd a function of higher cognition and therefore an abstract concept. Why is it close to the concrete input stage? They talk about recurrent networks, does the hippocampus give feedback to the "input stage", maybe slowly as in conditioning? They "simplified recurrence into a continuum of statistical connectivity to sensory inputs" to probalisticly show a directional hierarchy.
Their methods are interesting, but far beyond me. They seem to build a model of the brain into a NN and test that, where a modified NN is the control group.
Is there any evidence that it does?
And yes, this is science. What is your alternative? Just say "must be the almighty" and do nothing? Because doing that is surely more scientific?
In that spirit, you'll help things a lot by avoiding making combative, straw-man comments like 'What is your alternative? Just say "must be the almighty" and do nothing? Because doing that is surely more scientific?'
That is best practice on HN at all times, but even more so on hot-button topics like this.
edit: I guess I'm playing a bit of devil's advocate here to expose the circularity in some arguments that arise when considering these kind of deeply fundamental questions. In fact, my feeling is these kind of more or less subtle logical traps cannot be avoided in this areas of thought.
Well, not really. For example, we don't understand how some brain function works. For some reason we might get a hypothesis that it is governed by a production of a certain neurotransmitter (very simplified here). At that time we have no other version of how the function might work at all. Then we do experiments where we mess with the said neurotransmitter, or a brain region, etc. If the results show that there is no measurable effect on the brain function, then that hypothesis becomes disproven (or at least a certain specific way of understanding that hypothesis).
If there is no alternative that might just mean that we haven't found it yet. Or that the current framework we're using is not suitable to the question. But even then working on existing hypothesis might give a lot of information on what framework might actually work.
The point I think the commenter was making is that the statement "The goal was to understand how abstract thought arises from brain structure" suggests there may be some begging the question in the study design.
If you start with the assumption that that brain structure produces abstract thought, your evidence will support it, because you already believed it in the first place.
The main challenge to any hypothesis about the nature of thought or consciousness is that our fundamental tool for contemplating the topic is our consciousness - which is precisely what we're trying to understand.
On that basis, the argument goes, it's impossible to objectively determine what consciousness really is, because we have no way of separating the consciousness we're studying from the consciousness we're using to study it.
Alternative theories to the one that says the brain produces consciousness are that the brain is a carrier or receiver of consciousness, which somehow originates elsewhere.
Various forms of such theories have been proposed by reputable scientists including Roger Penrose[1], John Eccles[2] and - somewhat ironically - Karl Popper[3].
I personally don't have any strong opinions about the validity of these theories; it's enough for me to know that they exist and to keep an open mind until someone can develop a truly testable and falsifiable hypothesis.
Until then, it's all pretty much philosophy.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Penrose#Physics_and_cons...
[2] http://www.theosophy-nw.org/theosnw/science/prat-bra.htm
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem#Popp...
>Is it also impossible to research matter, because we can't seperate the matter we study ... ? Am I missing the analogy?
You seem to think that it should be possible to research matter, even though the prior argument seems to say it is impossible.
But in short, we can study matter to the extent that we can observe it from the outside using established scientific techniques. So we can form reasonably objective observations of the nature and behaviour of matter, because (at least for the sake of this argument), it is separate from our consciousness.
However, science is system of techniques and tools developed out of the consciousness of humans, so to study consciousness, you need to use science, which was created by consciousness, which we're trying to study using science... and so on.
So, short answer: we can use science to objectively study matter because it's separate from consciousness. It's harder to objectively study consciousness with science because that thing very we call science is a construct of consciousness.
That's begging the question. There's researchers writing a 18 page report about a 100 manyears of development and you stumble in here without really reading it, saying it's wrong on account of it not being right. Well, your circular logic leaves me unimpressed.
I think the uncertainty principle makes pretty clear, assuming for the sake of the argument that it is correct, that we can't observe matter without interfering. Ofc that's a matter of believe
The whole presumption of the article is that consciousness is related to matter. You are, if anything, changing the subject. You probably don't have a clue what consciousness is, no offense, I really don't. Sadly the quoted papers are not open access and I can't figure out sci-hub. Also, they are from a philosophical faculty, while I tend to the hard sciences.
Where would the inability to figure out conscioussness leave us, anyhow, do you just give up?
I'm not saying the research isn't useful, but rather that the way it was described in this article raised doubt about just how far the findings go in answering the deepest questions about consciousness (at least compared to what was implied in the headline).
I agree with you that I'm in no position to refute the countless hours of work by people far more more educated on the topic than me.
And I'm not saying we have no way of understanding consciousness, just that there's a limit to how deeply we can ultimately understand it, as at some point you'd have to step outside of your own consciousness. But if your position is that the same may be true for matter because fundamentally matter and consciousness may be inseparable, well I'm very open to that.
The comment of mine that you responded to was just answering someone else's question on the issue of whether the brain generates consciousness, or carries it in some other form.
I have no strong opinion on the matter; I take great interest in reading various hypotheses and philosophies and research studies, and the outcome is that just as you say, I don't have any idea what consciousness really is, because nobody else seems to either (though Roger Penrose's hypothesis about "quantum microtubules" is kinda cool, and seems to have some evidence to support it [1]).
Also, I'm with you on the uncertainty principle and the inability to observe matter with complete objectivity. But I resisted going there in the comment because, like I said, it's a rabbit hole.
But I really do look forward to more being discovered and debated about it.
[1] http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/01/140116085105.ht...
Consciousness is binary in my mind. To say that there is an understanding of consciousness sounds redundant to me, although understanding carries a notion of direction.
In case you're interested, a writer (and scientist) whom I've found very insightful and thought-provoking on this topic is Bernardo Kastrup:
Regarding the discussion of whether the brain produces or receives consciousness, I have to say the distinction seems misguided. Nobody thinks that an individual brain is the pure origin of all perception and thought. That would be a kind of solipsism.
We are embedded in a world, and the brain learns to interact with this world as it grows up. The brain is also "pre-populated" with stuff that evolution has selected; you emerge from your mother with a neural structure, and that structure isn't the source of itself.
Popper's "three worlds" [1] don't require the brain to work in any mysterious way unknown to science. I don't think Popper made claims about the physical nature of reality. He was basically just refuting ontological theories that insist that there is only one world (the physical) or two worlds (the physical and the mental), by explaining a pluralist ontology where the creations of thought (e.g. poems) are also considered really existing.
It reminds me of the recent philosophers of "object-oriented ontology," who also proclaim a pluralist ontology. And yeah, it is pretty much just philosophy: clarifying how to accurately think about the world.
So you can have a philosophical discussion about whether a poem is to be considered an actual thing (e.g. a Platonic form) or a mere structure imposed on matter (or whatever). But that's tangential to the scientific investigation of how the brain works.
I don't think scientists who study brain structures like those of the article really claim that the brain is the sole source of thought. That wouldn't make sense, because of course thought is influenced by extra-neural factors like language and interactions. And as I said in another comment, it seems obvious that the brain is a kind of radio, in that its major function is to perceive and react to the world around it.
Anyway, this is a pretty subtle discussion and it's hard to flesh out sufficiently in forum comments!
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popper%27s_three_worlds and http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/p/popper80....
It's clear that the brain is intimately involved in the expression of consciousness. But whether it's the source is really a question outside science. For example, it's role could also be analogous to a radio. Damage the radio and there goes the beautiful music. But seeing the radio as the source would be kinda missing the whole point, wouldn't it?
There is clearly an interaction between consciousness and physics; a simple proof is that we are now talking about consciousness (its existence somehow loops back into the physical world). Therefore, consciousness should be definitely part of science.
Most often I see the radio metaphor invoked in a vaguely mystical way, where the signal of consciousness is supposed to emanate from some totally unknown background source that nobody has any idea at all what it might be, except some people choose to call it "God." All that stuff is totally non-scientific until someone comes up with a clear hypothesis.
What happens when the science will eventually come up with technology to recreate (by all external empirical evidence) a human consciousness? Would you still say it's a "question outside science"? Then perhaps you can still claim that even the newely created mind inside a machine is also just a "radio" receiving the consciousness signals from the cosmos? Even so, of course noone can stop you from looking at things from that perspective, but then you can perhaps just look at the practical applications of understand exactly how such "radios" work and being able to have a technology which will in all external observable regards act as a human (even if you still perhaps won't believe it will have the same "real" type of consciousness as one).
The peculiar thing about this question is that normally people who don't understand some advanced science (like automobiles or computing or radio, etc.) - don't actively express a will to keep others from studying and developing that science. There are billions who don't understand all the intricacies of a modern smartphone, but almost none of them (minus the religious fanatics) say things like "humans should not try to find this out", "that is not a question for science", "you will never be able to understand that", "herecy!", etc.
And yet, when it comes to the science of consciousness, the mind, human cognition, artificial intelligence etc - we hear these voices all the time. "Stop studying the brain", "science can't help", "we'll never understand the mind", "it's above our abilities", etc. etc.
Latest years have shown a tremendous progress in understanding and recreating parts of human intelligence. The task is huge and a lot is left to do, but every new understanding or technology clearly shows a pattern that we are getting close to it. And yet no matter how much "evidence" (in form of recreating) comes up, people still seem to feel unsettled that the science tries (and slowly succeeds) to understand the human mind.
Having talked to many of these people it almost seems like they have a fear, a deep rooted fear of being a "machine" themselves. Somehow if they know that there is someone who understands how they work (and can recreate them), they feel like that diminishes their value, or perhaps removes their "soul" somehow? Well it doesn't. No amount of technical understanding and technological will abilities will diminish any subjective religious and other deep experiences. Because that's what they are: subjective.
> But seeing the radio as the source would be kinda missing the whole point, wouldn't it?
What point are these scientists missing? They are simply trying to create Strong AI. There is no "point" to this besides the technology itself.
Sorry if anyone is upset, I'm just trying to understand the objection here. The scientists are clearly doing great and useful work, why would anyone think that they are wrong in doing that?
As to the question of the soul - sure there exist religious people who fear that science might demystify something they think should stay mysterious.
But the fact that such people exist doesn't strengthen the argument that consciousness is just a product of a certain kind of machine.
That may yet turn out to be true, but it is simply an unproven assertion at this time. It is attractive to pursue it because we have been successful at using machines to simulate other physical phenomena.
There is zero evidence that we are close to producing consciousness in machines. We have plenty of examples of simulating independent information processing functions that are adaptive to their inputs in ways that are analogous to the brain.
To assert that this indicates that we are getting close to reproducing consciousness is to affirm the consequent - that consciousness is just a paricular kind of algorithm. That's not scientific either.
The radio analogy can't be dismissed so easily by resorting to straw men. It doesn't imply a mystical source. It simply implies that consciousness is not located in the brain. One simple non-mystical explanation for this is that consciousness is a social phenomenon.
If this turns out to be true, then it would change the nature of strong AI from a standalone 'consciousness' to something that can only exist as an extension of our collective consciousness. It also opens the door for AI to do harm to our collective consciousness even without a singularity-like self-improving AGI take off.
Machines are a metaphor. Biological processes approximate machines to the extent that we can develop machines that capture their behavior, but to date these are strictly limited.
> What happens when the science will eventually come up with technology to recreate (by all external empirical evidence) a human consciousness? Would you still say it's a "question outside science"? Your question already presupposes that this will be possible. To you, it’s a question of “when” not of “if”. Your argument for that is the progress we’ve lately seen in AI. To me, and many others, this is like somebody saying that they’re closer to flying because he climbed a hill taller than others.
But even assuming that this will have happened, does this mean that we’re machines and nothing more? Or that we’ve just fooled ourselves with a clever contraption? I know it’s frustrating, and many people want to swipe this under the rug, but it’s clear we still won’t know for sure.
This is an important point, but I don't think the best course of action is to mark consciousness as something that lies outside the scope of science. I certainly think that there are some broader problems to be solved which involve how one deals with investigation into a domain that appears to be reflexive. "Consciousness" is a valid domain of investigation, but the question to ask becomes "Can we come to an agreement over how to distinguish what we are investigating?" Additionally, can we really call consciousness an "object" of investigation? The problem is that we, the subject, are investigating an object, which is us, the subject. It seems like there is some analogue of the subject-object problem that injects itself into the situation at that point.
The investigation of consciousness (among other things) becomes muddled when the majority of participants in the discourse can't stabilize on how to actually distinguish or demarcate consciousness as an object of investigation - that problem is tangled because the act of explaining consciousness presupposes consciousness.
Similarly, we must use the condition of living in order to explain life, and we must use the condition of "being embedded in language" in order to describe language. One cannot escape those systems in their attempts to describe them. A scientist's description of consciousness must necessarily account for the process by which he describes it.
But this isn't anything too radical or new. I'm not sure this means that it's something beyond the grasp of science.
This means that either the brain is producing abstract thought or that the brain is some sort of dualist mechanism for interacting with a soul of some description.
We have a very good theory describing how (in principle) the chemical structure of the brain can lead to observed behavior. The hard part now is figuring out the implementation details. I can tell you how a computer works in general even though I can't tell you how, exactly, a particular model running a particular OS works.
On the other hand, we have no physical evidence that dualism is correct (i.e. that thought arises from some non-physical mechanism), and any theory posited to account for this is vastly more complicated than the relatively simple behaviour governing the activity of neurons in the brain. Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate.
It also seems strange to me, if there is a non-physical mechanism of thought, that imbibing certain chemicals can vastly alter the behavior of this mechanism. On the other hand, this makes perfect sense if the source of thought is chemical interaction between neurons.