He is misquoting myself and/or other people who've talked about the encryption before. Sony has their own format they call SELF (secure ELF?) which works as follows: each ELF segment (not section) has a key/iv generated for it and is encrypted with AES-CTR (previously same keys were used for different segments, making it vulnerable to attacks). The keys are placed into the header and encrypted with AES-CBC. The decryption key for this is the important one, which if we obtain, allows the decryption of any* SELF. (So an mis-implemented encryption has happened before and doesn't mean 'oh the military uses AES, so anything that uses AES is unbreakable')

There's also the signatures which prevent modifying the SELFs even if we got the decryption keys. The ECDSA random-fail was what happened to the PS3. This has nothing to do with the encryption though. (There was also no "constant 4" that was just a simplification in the slide deck of the presenters. It was meant as a joke.)

But I do understand all the gross simplification CTurt made because the audience for this article is people who watch the console hacking scene, and in the console hacking scene, almost nobody knows anything about crypto. I frequently have to answer why brute forcing 128-bit AES keys is not possible. Then, inevitably, the asker will declare why we don't just try to guess then. Once I was informed that computers will become faster, so, in the future, we can brute force keys "at the speed of light." I asked them how many meters per second we can crack keys now.

* Okay, technically not any. I haven't gone into NPDRM, which is an additional layer of encryption for purchased games. Different keys are also used for different components (for example, kernel vs. user libraries).