The whole D-Wave thing is mostly irrelevant for cryptography, which the article doesn't mention. Even if the D-Wave devices turn out to be useful for some special algorithms, they can't run Shor's algorithm, which is what endangers crypto.
Also calling 1024 bit a "really long key" is a bit strange. They are already endangered by classical computers, no need for quantum computing here.
That said: The call for postquantum crypto is right.
So there is a $500 million price ready for the first operational Quantum computer. http://ba.net/util/bitcoin/design1.html#quantum
The component they lack is that they can not preserve any non-trivial information between their qubits.
This is the original I think: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0403090
[1]. http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:680572/FULLTEXT01...
[2]. https://dwave.wordpress.com/2011/05/11/learning-to-program-t...
[3]. https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn21699-controversial-q...
https://www.reddit.com/r/crypto/comments/3ig0xf/does_anyone_...
The issue IS not 256-bit it is the password you used to encrypt it with. Using letters, caps, symbols and numbers with 12 that would be an incredibly large budget to get your password.
In 1999 you could break a 512-bit RSA key with a supercomputer, in 2015 you can do it with 4 hours and $75 on EC2: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/breaking-512-bit-rsa...
A 768-bit RSA keys has been factored in a large academic effort: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1000.pdf
When you pick a key length, you want it to be long enough to provide security for your communications as far into the future as practicable, and the classical efforts to break RSA are getting uncomfortably close to 1024-bits. Maybe in a few decades it would be practical for some adversaries to break even perfectly made 1024-bit keys.
However, I'm not a cryptographer, so someone please correct me if I'm wrong.
He didn't compare anything.
No, he did:
>>> 1024 bit keys are endangered? .... You can't even break 256 bits
1024 bit key = most likely something like RSA
256 bit key = some symmetric algorithm or ECC
He's implying a 1024 bit RSA key should be safe because a 256 bit key from some other algorithm is.
RSA 1024 is a broken encryption scheme (2010). In Jan 2010 there was already the concern it was broken or quickly to be broken. http://arstechnica.com/security/2010/01/768-bit-rsa-cracked-...
in March 2010 http://www.techworld.com/news/security/rsa-1024-bit-private-...
I took his statement of "Only in some broken encryption schemes" to be a misunderstood reference to stuff like this: http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/how-the-nsa-can-brea... or a side channel attack.
Your second link has garbage sensationalized headline. It actually describes a side channel attack that has nothing to do with cryptography algorithms. It's basically equivalent to a clever way of looking over someone's shoulder.