ULA bows out of Pentagon launch competition, paving way for SpaceX
washingtonpost.com
washingtonpost.com
> This is totally a valid selling point
Respectfully, a selling point is only valid if your customer base care.This just means they don't insure and instead absorb losses. AFAIK they don't even set aside a pool of money like corporate self-insurance tends to do.
>CRS missions appear to carry commercial insurance
This is to (partially) cover the losses to the commercial space companies, since NASA withholds money in the event of a failure. None of it covers the payload. (Actually at least in Orbital's case they get paid a portion of the CRS contract, since there's technically two milestones – ignition/liftoff and mission success. They lose out on the latter.[1])
[1] http://spacenews.com/42658orbital-sciences-entitled-to-parti...
Ironically, I can't drive my car without insurance but I can fly a plane without it.
The reason they had to drop out is because they're a space launch company without any goddamned engines. The chatter about the bid process is just the typical jawing members of the defense cartel engage in when they deign to speak of competitors. Sometimes they're even successful in reopening the bid process. [1]
All rocket, no engines.
After Russia annexed Crimea, Congress banned the Pentagon from using Russian rocket engines. Russia responded by counter-banning the Pentagon from using its engines [3]. This made things complicated for ULA.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RD-180
[2] http://www.ulalaunch.com/faqs-rd-180.aspx
[3] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-13/russia-ban...
So if you're a rocket company and don't make your own engines you're not really a rocket company, you're just talk.
I have't been paying close attention, but maybe you know this. Didn't Russia actually ban export of engines for military launches over Crimea before congress?
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/may/15/us-space-mili... http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-russian-rocket-ban-201...
The Falcon 9 explosion, Space-X claims, was due to a strut being far under-strength. When they tested their inventory of struts made by a contractor, some failed at 20% of the rated load. Space-X hasn't provided further details. They claim to be "tightening up their supply chain". That probably means requiring 100% traceability of every structural part back to the raw material and much more testing at incoming inspection. This is standard in aviation (which is why structural failure airplane crashes of production aircraft are very rare) but something Space-X wasn't doing.
One wonders what other problems they've found as they put part after part through strength tests. Probably more than they've admitted, or they'd be launching by now.
[1] http://spaceflightnow.com/2015/09/01/falcon-9-rocket-to-be-g...
https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/els/reports/STA_Print.cfm?mode=in...
All the pieces are coming together for the next launch, now.
One itty-bitty nitpick. There's one more F9 1.1 launch scheduled: Jason 3 set to launch out of Vandenberg as the 3rd launch after they resume. After that the old ones are done, though.
That is going to require sources. Primary responsibility for quality is going to have been the original manufacturer's. SpaceX of course will have had to (and I don't believe didn't) done their own check testing of components, but you write a contract with a supplier to put the risk on them for the timely supply of to-spec and to-tolerance parts.
And then you take it to your supplier when they've failed to meet their contracted failure rates, which could also be called "tightening up your supply chain."
I'm sure there'll be more quality involvement on SpaceX's side but I'd be awfully surprised if they weren't generally following industry standards.
Failures of novel engineering happens sometimes.
First off, they can't meet SpaceX's prices, no matter what, so they're unlikely to win out on a straight-up bid on a single launch (they love those block buys).
Secondly, they don't have any more RD-180s to build more Atlas V's, which means they can't realistically promise any future Atlas launches. If they did they'd have to crawl back and say "sorry, can't do it." Alternately, they could try to put forward a Delta IV launch as an option, but that's even more expensive.
Thirdly, putting in a singular bid at this point and trying to cut their profit margin to the bone as much as possible would hit them doubly hard. On the one hand it would mean they'd make no money. On the other hand it would reveal publicly their true costs, and make it blatantly obvious how much they're over-charging on launches with the block buys plus launch assurance subsidy (which run at over $300 million per core, or so).
They're better off laying low and just hoping they can work their connections for more back-door block buys in the future.
Here's the corresponding link to this story on that sub:
https://www.reddit.com/r/spacex/comments/3t31gt/ula_says_it_...
I, for one, am quite excited about ULA's planned Vulcan rocket [0] which incorporates reusability of the engine section, and hope it will be a success. I'm sure you will find that the most active members of /r/spacex feel much the same way.
The reality is that a lot of people treat them exactly that way. They are on team SpaceX, and they root for them and against ULA, who is seen as the establishment who gets ahead using politics and lobbying rather than tech.
"the Air Force used a procurement process that would give a lot of weight to the prices companies bid"
That's hysterical! The gall of the Air Force to do such a thing!
Not just in this case, but plenty of government contracts are sole-sourced. How does the price get decided when there's no competition?
It helps stop the government from telling the contractor to do something new half-way through the contract, and for the contractor to then bump billing without new competition (the race condition leading to a 400% expected cost in a jet engine for example...). Instead, the contract terms are battled over in the beginning to line out exactly what the contractor will deliver, and up to how much they can bill for it (the government, and public, always appreciate it if you can find a way to not spend all the money).
If the government decides, part way through the contract period, that it wishes the contractor to do something extra, a new supplemental contract is drawn up and new extra funding requested and maybe approved. This supplement generally has to be published I think, so other contractors and watch-dogs can call foul if the extra work is significant enough that it should be re-competed.
The risk is that if the terms aren't fantastic and the goal of the contract complex, that you can end up in a quagmire of supplemental contract nightmares.
Some further reading on the benefits and risks of the method:
0 - memo with recommendations of FFP as a more prominent consideration in new contracts to reduce potential costs to the government.
1 - presser on Office of Management and Budgets' directives to retool contract staffs toward FFP.
2 - Discussion in WSJ of why it's not always the best idea.
3 - best practices in the contract writing process.
0: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/pr...
1: http://archive.federaltimes.com/article/20091102/ACQUISITION...
2: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487041215045745936...