Volkswagen, Offering Amnesty, Asks Workers to Come Forward on Emissions Cheating
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
If anything there should be whole slew of emails documenting this feature and its reasons for existence and who authorized this. VW 'asking' is tantamount to them saying they still don't know how this whole thing happened which is fairly incredible.
It's quite something to watch an industry giant flail like this, when Mercedes had their A-class debacle they got the story under control relatively quickly, VW seems to go from a certain level of bad to something even worse every time I read the news.
They may even be able to "find" an employee who has some kind of plausible story.
The reality is that most auto manufacturers cheat on emissions tests in europe. Mechanics who work on the cars know it. Even the regulators are hesitant to reform emissions testing.
The silver lining is that perhaps an actual improvement in emissions is happening, with the EPA adding road-testing to their emissions test suite.
That's how I read the headline. Good thing I wasn't in mid sip when I read it[1]. You can imagine what would happen to an engineer that tried to bring that up. I swear you can smell that dynamic at a company within fifteen minutes of walking in the door.
[1] Seriously this sort of stuff happens, the board members should be banned from serving on a board of directors again.
> They may even be able to "find" an employee who has some kind of plausible story.
Maybe! But then they are just claiming to be incompetent as an auto engineering organization, rather than malicious. An interesting choice.
Personally I wouldn't write a line of code like that even when authorized by management, I'd rather resign (but then again that's a argued from a position of relative luxury), but I hope that German programmers working for VW or Bosch would want to see some very explicit authorization that this is exactly what it is they are supposed to make with a note to the effect that they believe this is not legal or ethical or both.
If not they may very well end up holding the bag, I have no doubt that this thing will be researched to the bottom.
That’s already a good sign.
Email trails are easy to get rid of.
My company rolled out full disk encryption using TPM due to HIPAA concerns. Then we got a new email retention policy of 6 months after which emails were deleted because we were migrating from Lotus Notes to Exchange. We had a local archive option for people who wanted to retain emails older than 6 months. Then we got a hardware refresh where those archives were not automatically migrated to new hardware. Not that the new machines had Lotus Notes anyways. The IT Asset group was instructed to remove Hard drives from old hardware and wipe them because HIPAA. Even if they hadn't wiped the drives, they weren't documenting which drive came from which machine when they binned them so you wouldn't be able to decrypt the drive because TPM. Also they were removing asset tags from decommissioned machines as they prepared them for the reseller. 12 months later they reevaluated the email retention policy and decided to increate it 24 months.
Emails? What emails.
This is just blatant scapegoating. Your cars cheated on emissions test because you willfully ignored a decade of evidence! This is a case of pervasive organizational intent. You saw no evil, heard no evil, and spoke no evil, from the top management on down. Even the government regulators participated.
This is such bullshit.
Things like this happen every day in organizations all over the world, when systems are not understood or willfully guided. It's just that most of them don't make the news—they simply silently eat at productivity and joy of work until a modern joyless inhuman organization is created. Everyone saw no evil, heard no evil, and spoke no evil—and it still happens.
It's not pervasive organizational intent—it's pervasive organizational chaos.
Exactly.
> It's not pervasive organizational intent—it's pervasive organizational chaos.
Well, in this case the chaos adapted rather optimally to the physics of diesel engines, the regulatory environment, and the emissions testing regime. I'd say it's worthwhile to treat that as intent -- to create incentive to decide how to act intentionally, rather than let chaos and circumstances form your intent.
I don't think I'd take it. The article says you can still be transferred to a different department or given different duties, and they can't insulate you from criminal charges.
"I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on here!"
I mean, they even say you may still face criminal charges for coming forward.
I recall Mrs Thatcher queried this.
Second, the German government is the largest external shareholder of VW[2] – so you can assume that this action was made under acceptance of the government.
[1] http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/sueddeutsche-us...
[2] Well, the largest shareholder of VW is Porsche Group. The largest shareholder of that is VW. It’s complicated. Effectively, most of it belongs to the Porsche/Piech family and the German government.
However, if they had been in opposition to the state itself, it would probably be a different story. For instance, I don’t think Snowden could ever fully trust a (theoretical) offer of amnesty from the U.S. government. A similar situation (to the VW one) exists with employees of the state who continue to be employed by the state – they interact with the state more (in its role as their employer), and more interaction means more possibilities of harassment. Also, even some people who quit their jobs would be affected; these would be people who were employed by state actors which have a lot of interactions with people in general, like the IRS, the DMV or the Police. I would imagine that former employees at any of these organizations who quit their jobs and turned whistleblowers would experience trouble from their former employers. On the other hand, a whistleblowing former clerk from, say, the Department of Veterans Affairs, would probably not.
What I’m saying here is that there are two factors: The degree of interaction a person has with the organization after the event, and the degree to which the person was percieved to be in direct opposition to the organization itself. The VW employees score very highly on both these factors, while the median person offered amnesty from prosecution from the state usually scores low on both.
Such a good relationship that none of them felt safe coming forward in the first place AND they were the first ones VW threw under the bus...
Also, the story seems to have been that the "cheat" was a special mode explicitly programmed for test purposes and not something totally under the covers. The "crime" was in enabling that mode under field conditions. That change may not be covered by source code revision control, if it were made in a config file outside of SCC.
In a field more of us here understand, it would be similar to coding a feature in a server that dumps user passwords to the log file in plain text. Such a feature would be useful for certain debugging situations, but it would be disastrous to have it enabled on a production box. So you'd put a big all-caps warning in the source code, documentation, example config files saying whatever you do don't turn this on in production. Supposedly the engine management developers did something along those lines, but the folks who built the cars ignored the warning and enabled the mode anyway.
> In a field more of us here understand, it would be similar to coding a feature in a server that dumps user passwords to the log file in plain text.
No, it's like coding that feature but explicitly making it turn off whenever it detects a security review. How is that justifiable?
What remains is explaining how engineering managers higher up (all the way to the top) could remain willfully ignorant of the fact that VW's diesel engines "passed" emissions without resorting to exotic tech like Mercedes' bluetec exhaust fluids. They knew there was some sort of magic in their engines that set them apart, but they either understood it was cheating, or they never asked any questions.
> What remains is explaining how engineering managers higher up (all the way to the top) could remain willfully ignorant of the fact that VW's diesel engines "passed" emissions without resorting to exotic tech like Mercedes' bluetec exhaust fluids.
How often do high level managers at a big company have a good handle on technical implementation details of specific systems and what the implications of those details actually are?
It's possible that these people either had non-technical backgrounds, technical backgrounds in unrelated areas, or out of date technical backgrounds (like they last worked with this stuff back when cars still commonly had carburetors).
I wouldn't be surprised to see him go to jail.
I think it depends on how general the implementation was. I could imagine real world uses for a feature to generically detect certain conditions and change parameters in response (e.g. to support different settings for highway vs city driving). If you have something general enough, then the "defeat device" could have just been a ruleset that only matched a very narrow set of conditions that usually only occurs during the tests.
Incompetence happens, but requiring chained events of successive incompetence to explain an outcome to explain an event doesn't seem rational to me.
I'm still cynical.
I've seen that exact thing (and worse...) on a production server in some job recently. But that big all-caps warning wasn't there, the docs were absent and there was no config bit to switch on/off, I found the file more or less by accident (wondering what all the io was that ate up the machine).
The new CEO and board just want to collect evidence whom of the board gave the order (and thereby can be sued in court for damages)
Now, if the German government is going to make the cars exempt from the 0.26 € per kWh electricity tax, they will be cheaper than gas, too.
Someone programmed these cars to 'lie' to the Feds. This caused damage to the environment and these cars dropped in resale value as a result, erasing millions of dollars of value from personal balance sheets.
Someone (not the shareholders paying a fine) should be held personally responsible and face criminal prosecution.
This amnesty seems to be – from what I get from the media – something the new CEO wants to be able to collect evidence against his predecessors.
I'm still at a bit of a loss on this whole rogue employee scenario. I'm a little more concerned about the rest of the software if this is true.
Not that any witches exist of course, just for a scapegoat.