All anonymity is not created equal: you're better off if we can only figure out that one out of 6 billion people bought a Nickelback album, then if we know it was either you or one guy in Tristan da Cunha. The size of you're anonymity set matters and Cryptonote provides a rather small one in comparison to Zerocash. This is not to say Cryptonote is worthless, there are tradeoffs between the two, but Zerocash has a distinct advantage in terms of anonymity and I think it matters.
Cryptonote's ring signatures scale linearly in the number of people your transactions are mixed with. As a result, you can't mix an individual transaction with that many people without it getting too big and too computationally costly(chaining transactions doesn't solve this). In contrast, Zerocash mixes every transaction with every other transaction ever[1].
If you are worried about maintaining privacy given repeated interactions with merchants or others who already have some partial information about you, the size of the anonymity set matters considerably. Longterm intersectional attacks are a major problem with anonymity systems. The smaller the set you mix with on any given transaction, the easier it is for some third party to use outside information to eliminate everyone else in the mixing set (e.g because she knows no one else in the set was online at the time of the transaction or was in your approximate geographic area), and determine the true spender. One of the few effective defenses we have for this is to simply include as many people as possible in the anonymity set. If you want to avoid companies building financial profiles of users from the blockchain, this is precisely the type of attack you need to thwart.
[1] Technically, up to 2^64 transactions and the networks ability to handle the spent serial number list. So there is a limit, but it's rather large.