After guilty plea, judge confused why prosecutors still want iPhone unlocked
arstechnica.com
arstechnica.com
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/feds-apple-must-s...
""" That's because unlocking the iPhone was never about this case. It was about putting Apple in the position of unlocking every iPhone that the government will ever want unlocked now and into the future because if you do one you have no argument against doing the next one. And to make sure that all iPhones now and into the future can be unlocked. There, does that make more sense? """
That's really all this is about.... setting precedent and pushing legal events down a logical path that'll eventually lead to a judge ruling Apple must make backdoors into all future iOS versions. They have to push hard to get a favorable ruling quickly before everyone updates to the new iOS that Apple can't unlock at all. Because by then they'd have a much more difficult legal argument to make.
Logically speaking, circumstances have allowed for the outcome of this case to be aided by iPhone data. Practically speaking, the reason they're pushing so hard in this case is because the guy is utterly indefensible -- he's a guilty-pled drug distributor, and there are undoubtedly few who would defend him. Just as sure, there are people somewhere who would prefer justice be meted as painfully as possible, and anyone who defends this guy would be a pariah in their eyes, but sticking up for the rights and fair treatment of the guilty is the greatest thing you can do to assure your own rights and fair treatment in the future.
I have no love for meth, and I have no love for street drugs with their unknown purity and potentially toxic adulterants, but asserting that the defendant is indefensible smacks of a pro-drug-war bias that mystifies me.
Saying that he is utterly indefensible is saying that, because he is guilty of something illegal, instead of losing some freedoms, laws and rights no longer apply at all. Although we have no evidence of anything else to charge anyone with (which legally we need to conduct a search), we might find something if we can look. That's illegal and immoral, but we can and no one will stop it because they don't want to be seen supporting him. That seems to be the sense of indefensible meant.
The crime and it's result is one thing. Setting a precedent for free-range witch-hunts is another; those have a bad history.
To capture what I meant, I should probably have said "because the guy is utterly indefensible ... in the eyes of most."
The point though is that it is those cases in which everybody (or enough of everybody) agrees that the defendant is "bad" and must be "punished" that our rights take the biggest hit, because so few object to a warrantless search executed on a guilty meth distributor, or pedophile, or terrorist, or whatever other bogeyman is accepted as belonging 100% to the out-group.
No, it doesn't.
I know it's a great conspiracy theory, but it's not really likely.
It's actually significantly more likely they want to unlock the phone to try to get more evidence against the other 6 people he was charged with, probably because it's lacking.
Federal prosecutors, whatever you think of them, are generally not dumb. They know this is not the strongest argument they can make, and so if they really didn't need the evidence, they would drop it and make the argument in a context that wasn't trivial.
Seriously. They deal with tons of drug offenses every day. So do the judges.
It's much better for them to wait for a child-killing baby-eater who also has child porn on his phone or something that plays better than "yeah, uh, we want to go look for evidence against the other 6"
A lot of what Snowden put out wasn't new at all, it just gave us particulars on what we already knew or had very good reason to suspect based on that information. (e.g. if they have one fiber tap, they probably have many fiber taps.) [1] [2]
'The Government' is not one single unitary entity. It's a massive, sprawling bureacracy, with most agencies almost completely unaware of what the other is doing. Interagency cooperation is a rarity.
US Attorneys are certainly not the NSA's minions.
[1] http://archive.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/04/70...
Except possibly when they are arguing that nothing the NSA does should ever be revealed, and that nobody has a right to sue the NSA.
Goodness the irony: Nobody is allowed secrets save the government.
Helpful link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_juries_in_the_United_Sta...
Do you want the government making your indictment proceedings public? What if the grand jury declines to bring charges?
Should add "without a license", because pharma companies sell millions of dollars of methamphetamine tablets a year.
It's not-at-all common, though. Much less than "millions of dollars" of it being sold.
It's approved in the US for obesity as well as attention disorders. Schedule II, just like common painkillers (the non toxic ones anyways; adding a liver toxin moves painkillers to lower Schedule III).
Patient: "I can't stay awake, I can't concentrate and even though my diet is reasonable and I get exercise I can't drop weight."
Doctor: "Do you have good dental insurance?"
Patient: "Um, yes. Why do you ask."
Doctor. "What I'm about to write you a prescription for tends to cause dental problems as a side effect"
Just like if you start taking a diuretic you should increase water intake, other medicines require other steps.
It seems like USG will be unsuccessful at compelling Apple to unlock the phone. If there are no security vulnerabilities in the trusted hardware, then there is literally nothing special Apple can do to help unlock it. Although we can hope for a stay (in the sense of not advancing the inevitable big picture) whereby USG successfully attacks the chip with acid.
There may then be a detour where USG attempts to compel Apple to push an update to a new (and unknowing) suspect that renders their security moot. This entire process would be under a gag order (since it's an ongoing investigation), so perhaps it's even already happening. Once again, I guess I hope this is successful to avoid the otherwise inevitable showdown.
The next move directly pertaining to this situation will be for USG to push for some law banning the sale of encryption that cannot be opened with a court order. Yes, this battle has been fought before. But this time we're dealing with a purpose-built device, distributed turnkey by a commercial company. USG may not be able to compel Apple to act, but it can certainly constrain their actions when they do.
Also, technology is now acceptable to put on the "news" so the entire populace can be browbeaten with the four horsemen to make them compliant and dilute techies' informed voice. The percentage of civil disobedience will be insignificant - LUKS will likely not be setting precedent.
Plus the major technology companies having become part of the establishment and vice-versa, so cooperating with the government is in their direct business interest (as long as the PR is managed). In this larger situation, Apple will cry uncle long before USG does - I doubt they want an import ban.
So all of this points to such a law being passed, I'd guess 2-3 years out. If Free solutions aren't outright criminalized by the same legislation (ala RIPA), then something supplemental after that. It's a lot easier to "address" questions of constitutionality and basic human rights against a single unsympathetic defendant.
Will we successfully retreat to steganographic filesystems, and can we encourage enough drug dealers et al to adopt them such that the leviathan encounters effective technological pushback? Or do we have to wait for all of this to become widely accepted, then for norms to adapt and persecution to finally end? Interesting times indeed.
There's also some unencrypted content which could be dumped with a signed ROM on a locked/powered off phone, although I believe there are ways to dump this as non-apple. This has evolved over time -- it was much more open pre iOS 8, and I haven't read the entire iOS 9 documentation or tried to verify it for iOS 9 yet.
The rate limit portion is in hardware, but the 10 tries is not. IMO Apple should make an effort to avoid being in a privileged position for deployed phones; it's unavoidable with iCloud for the current architecture, but they could do a lot to avoid the "special rom can dump more" issue. At the very least the 10 tries and dead could be moved into hardware.
Honestly if Apple can indeed break their own security, I would call that fortunate for not advancing the inevitable showdown. Widespread proprietary software puts us in a very poor position for creating precedents, since Apple is eminently controllable by USG.
Can you elaborate on that a bit? I didn't see anything in RIPA that criminalizes open source encryption.