But one point in particular bothered me (and perhaps I'm misreading it):
> It’s incumbent on anyone creating a new network of any kind not just to avoid using it yourself for criminal purposes, but to design it so that it’s not useful for criminal purposes.
Isn't a network, by definition, useful for criminal purposes? Perhaps the author means not more useful for criminal purposes than for legal ones, but what exactly might that mean? And by whose laws are we describing criminality?
I also think this argument is tremendously problematic, maybe even self-defeating, in the context of encryption. If we, as the author proposes, were to have a network designed from the beginning to be capable of eventual decentralization [1], doesn't that imply heavy use of cryptography? I can't imagine a digital network where you can create privacy (and therefore agency) any other way.
And yet clearly, government entities like the FBI are publicly railing against encryption as a useful tool for terrorists and criminals. Plenty of people, myself included, find this policy debate to be frighteningly under-informed, but if your goal is to avoid government attention to maximize the chances for success, it's not our opinion that matters, it's the FBI's. So I think think this kind of friction is unavoidable, implying the smart money is on people who can cleverly minimize its impact.
[1] On a related note, I'm working on exactly this problem, at a protocol level. If you're curious, check out our documentation repo https://github.com/Muterra/doc-muse