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Comment by pdkl95 | Hacker News Reader

Intel describe[1] SGX as a feature designed to "enable software vendors to deliver trusted[2] applications", where applications would "maintain confidentiality even when an attacker has physical control of the platform and can conduct direct attacks on memory".

This already suggests the owner of the CPU isn't who they are protecting, but it gets worse (even before we consider the risk from AMT). Starting an SGX enclave seems to require[3] a "launch key" that is only known by Intel, allowing Intel to control what software is allowed to be protected by SGX.

[1] https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2013/09/26/protecting...

[2] Before the term "DRM" was coined, the same crap used to be called "trusted computing" (back when Microsoft was pushing Palladium/NGSCB)

[3] https://jbeekman.nl/blog/2015/10/intel-has-full-control-over...

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This kind of feature would be amazing for security if it wasn't going to be immediately abused with DRM encumbered vendors, MS, and vague yet menacing government agencies trying to lock users out of their own devices.

If I could provide all the keys my machine could be completely locked down and damn near impossible to break into even with complete physical access and a ECE degree.

One thing we would actually want, here, though, is a setup where you can rent out your computer (i.e. as an IaaS provider), without being capable of monitoring the renter. In that kind of setup, the tenant does not want you to own "all the keys to your machine"—or, at least, they want to have some way to verify that you have disabled/discarded those keys.

> One thing we would actually want, here, though, is a setup where you can rent out your computer (i.e. as an IaaS provider), without being capable of monitoring the renter.

That would require all hardware to be secure against all attackers. As soon as one attacker breaks one hardware model, they can start extracting and selling private keys that allow anyone to emulate that piece of hardware in software.

I'm also having a hard time seeing the use case. What kind of thing has hard secrecy requirements but demands so much hardware that you can't justify owning it?

Bingo! You could implement, for instance, a verifiable, safe Bitcoin mixer with it. (I pick this as a nice example, because it's something that is in demand (for better or worse) and is impossible to do at the moment.)

I don't see the point of this. Either you trust your cloud provider, or you don't put it in the cloud. You could think of a technical solution to prevent monitoring, but how can you ever be sure that your provider has actually implemented it? Plus, I don't think providers would want something like this; if there's something gravely illegal going on, you want to be able to know and ban that user from your service.

Exactly, cloud computing is a potentially much more important market for.SGX than DRM. Even though Intel could no doubt handover machine keys to any government agency on request without you knowing, it potentially protects you against e.g. malicious admins at a cloud provider. There has been some really interesting research recently on running applications in an sgx enclave where the OS itself runs outside the enclave and is completely untrusted (see e.g. the Haven paper from Microsoft Research at OSDI last year, it's extremely cool).

immediately abused for DRM? If you look (somewhat) closely, it's hard to avoid the impression that this stuff was designed and built around DRM use cases.

The "Protected A/V Path" could be a neat feature for high security computers (consider the GPU driver, a horrible, buggy, complex piece of software, being unable to grab pixels of a security-labelled window) - but that's not what this was built for. SGX, the same.

Non-DRM use cases seem to be an afterthought, if possible at all (typically not).

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