The Web Authentication Arms Race – A Tale of Two Security Experts | Hacker News Reader

The Web Authentication Arms Race – A Tale of Two Security Experts

blog.slaks.net

140 pointsPermit20 comments

I'm a fan of this dialogue style. Particularly for showing the history/motivations/context of a design or situation. Kerberos is what first introduced me to it http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dialogue.html

Thought this was going to be about password cracking, but instead turned out to be an interesting take on MITM vectors which bypass the password and piggyback on an existing session.

I would think that anyone with that level of access to compromise the channel would likely be able to just compromise the server itself?

> I would think that anyone with that level of access to compromise the channel would likely be able to just compromise the server itself?

That point is often brought up when discussing security, though personally I think non-maximally-effective attacks are also worth discussing - an attacker may have a reason to refrain from using full powers available for him. For instance, compromising the server immediately may lead to detection and subsequent mitigation of the attack, whereas just tapping a channel may remain undetected for long and let the attacker gather intelligence, select a particular target or perform some other, unexpected attack.

Mitm is often pretty easy, e.g. just arp spoof someone on the same network as you. Though if your target is on a different network, maybe not so simple. There's definitely a point where it probably makes more sense to try to attack the server than a well secured client; in general, hackers will aim for the weakest link (which I doubt will be your cookies not being channel bound)

Not so. The NSA smiley [1] showed that the smartest of attackers (or maybe the chinese are, but that's besides the point) are still (or were still, as of ~5 years ago) relying on passive MITM. It's far easier to exploit a passive vulnerability for a long time - Active exploits leave traces, give clues as to who you are. Passive exploits often leave the user without any idea that they are being snooped.

[1] https://www.google.com/search?q=nsa+smiley&es_sm=122&tbm=isc...

... because if a passive attack works and is easier to launch, why bother with an active attack?

> I will find or compromise a shady certificate authority and get my own certificate for your domain name

Woah there, I don't think this is a realistic expectation of an attacker.

However, the author is right in that it is much easier to attack the endpoints. Users install every piece of software on the planet, and the Firefox/Chrome user storage directory is in clear access for all programs. There are also many remote code execution vulnerabilities in the wild that could be used to query a database server or steal keys.

I thought the same. I think at this point we've graduated from "there's already a metasploit / other open source code for it" to "it's probably possible, if you are fairly determined but not necessarily the NSA". There's probably a few CAs with lax security procedures, just given how many there are... but hacking one is a much bigger endeavor than SSL stripping.

Attacker: I will buy the company that owns servers you are connecting to.

[offtopic] How many of you noticed that hovering on the left color band shows post list? clever UI/ bad design :/

MITM attack = Man-in-the-middle attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack

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