"Could people have just improved the configuration or setup of already rock-solid qmail?"
improved the configuration or setup
IMPROVED the CONFIGURATION or SETUP
Do you have an answer to my question about refusal to improve an already secure and proven solution? Or do you have another strawman point ready?
Think of the configuration method as using duct tape to permanently set the switches/levers of an f1 race car instead of just getting an automatic Toyota car that is simpler for almost all people to drive.
A lot of the security and simplicity is supposed to come from not having so many options/knobs/levers of operation.
I assume 5 years later it's much improved but at the time forking the code of an SMTPd that had security vulnerabilities didn't seem like a worthwile investment and everything else has a OpenBSD prohibitive license.
Edit: It was all pretty thoroughly discussed on various mailing lists and whatnot if you're curious
http://cr.yp.to/qmail/qmailsec-20071101.pdf
Far as their decision, that makes sense. I still think they should've leveraged proven design principles or tactics in the other software. I've just seen enough of these situations where I believe what you say about how their evaluation and decision process went. I figured licensing would factor into it, too.
http://cr.yp.to/qmail/qmailsec-20071101.pdf
Do you think they could apply any of that to current project? Particularly in sections 3-5. I defer to you here as your experience is directly relevant. Would any of his approach, on top of looking for top 10 C issues, have improved the security of this app? Or was none of that applicable?
Most people run Postfix out of the box (apt-get install, answer which domains you want to route mail for, done) and it's completely solid. Wietse Venema had a name for himself in security circles long before he started writing it. DJB too. Neither is likely to be the vulnerable link in your system.