Why the Human Brain Project Went Wrong and How to Fix It
scientificamerican.com
scientificamerican.com
"Despite skepticism in the neuroscience community, Markram won over the people who really mattered: funders at the European Commission, who seem to have looked less closely at the proposal's scientific feasibility than at its potential economic and political payoff."
One can see similar problems in smaller effort by Palm Founder Jeff Hawkin's efforts to jump-start algorithmically oriented neuroscience research with his book On Intelligence and his company Numenta.
With all the failures pretty visible now, I'd like to say I think there's some validity in seeing if one can extract a broad vision out of all the disparate threads of neuroscience research.
There have been events in the history of science when outsiders walked in and saw a forest instead of a lot of trees - see Craig Venter, Alfred Wegener and others (and there have been many more cranks who claimed to the same of course). Making some effort to see if that kind of approach can gel is worth some effort in the study of the brain, a field whose complexity is so huge that gradual, iterative research could continue in places for a thousand years and not answer basic questions.
I don't think a high failure rate even matters. If only 10% of billion dollar projects succeed, then spending $10 billion should get you something equivalent to a working human brain simulation. And hopefully at least something is learned from the failures. Even they don't succeed at building a human brain doesn't mean they don't learn anything.
I think the main barrier there, though, is that funders have to be in favor of interesting failure. With the described mega-science funding project, there's a big incentive to come up with dramatic plans that are novel and promise certain success.
I think the tech industry isn't perfect at this; we can all name companies that spent way too much money for what they learned. But our FFF/seed/A/B funding model gets us a good discount on interesting failures.
About two decades ago, I heard Rod Brooks talking about building a human brain. He'd done some good artificial insects and was big on purely reactive AI. At the time, he was promoting Cog [2], as a way to get to human-level AI in one big jump. I asked "You've done an insect brain. Why not try to get to a mouse brain next?". He replied "I don't want to go down in history as the man who created the world's greatest robot mouse." 20 years later, Brooks doesn't even have mouse-level AI, although he does have a robotic vacuum cleaner company.
A mouse has about 1g of brain mass; a human has about 1000g. But they're both mammals, with about 90% similar DNA. If someone could simulate a mouse at the neural simulation level, that would be real progress. Once you have a mouse simulation, human level is a scaling problem.
The Human Brain Project blew through a billion dollars in funding while OpenWorm is a volunteer effort. That's the real problem.
[1] http://www.openworm.org/ [2] http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/humanoid-robotics-group/cog/c...
It would appear that there is some emergent phenomenon (consciousness) somewhere on the scale between mouse and human. This phenomenon may be triggered by a surplus of "computational resource" with respect to "body to be controlled", which I personally think is unlikely. It may be triggered by a matching of computational resource to controllable complexity, i.e. the hands and fingers -> tool use, who knows?
There is so much we don't know about cognition. For example, are Whales/Dolphins self aware/conscious? They have the requisite brain mass, if it's simply a scaling problem.
I am genuinely interested in your perspective.
I adore my dog. He shows a wide range of what I believe to be genuine emotions. But I do not think he is self-aware, and by self-aware I mean able to contemplate his own existence (and therefor lack of existence). For that matter, I don't think he ever contemplates the lack of my existence (despite feeling it when I am not around, so I am told).
Other animals then present more consciousness, like chimps, dolphins, elephants etc and would place somewhere between the mouse and humans.
I'm not saying dogs sit around quoting Kant, but they're highly social animals and I find it hard to believe they don't have some internal representation of themselves.
“Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly; Man got to sit and wonder 'why, why, why?' Tiger got to sleep, bird got to land; Man got to tell himself he understand.”
I would expect him to exhibit less reliably to stimuli. His behaviour is closer to a large switch(stimulus){} statement than the emergent behavior of human reaction to situations and stimuli.
One example: he was stepped on when a small puppy by a very old man from that point on and to this day, many years later, he has a major dislike of old people that he does not know well.
If the same thing happened to a child, I would expect the child to slowly, over time, question why they disliked all other old people when the old people they do know are kind to them. This would result in a change of behavior without someone explicitly teaching them.
The only thing that makes humans truly unique is the fact that we can store, retrieve, and process information outside our bodies. While we can question our responses, as in your example, we don't - unless we live in a social environment that suggests we should. (Not all environments do. Some actively discourage it.)
Everything else we do - solving puzzles, counting, acting socially, teaching in person, showing emotions - appears in simple forms in at least some other animals.
Going up a level, humans are actually an extremely large, planet-spanning colony organism with very limited collective consciousness. We act more like an aimless flock of birds or mound-building insects than a collective with awareness of its own planetary situation.
furthermore there is a reason why in Buddhism this intellectual thinking and questioning is considered unessential to being.
Sure seems like the EU has it's fair share of incompetent technocrats if you can throw $1 billion at some nonsense any handful of PhDs in the field could have told you was nonsense if you'd just picked up a phone.
Sounds like most VC firms nowadays.
The problem with groundbreaking work is often that any handful of experts can tell you that it's nonsense. E.g., look at the reception that Barry Marshall got when he proposed that stomach ulcers were caused by bacterial infection. [1] All the experts "knew" it was caused by "stress, spicy foods, and too much acid" in the stomach. Eventually he got the Nobel prize, but you have to wonder what else we're missing out because whoever discovered it wasn't as dogged or as lucky as Marshall.
[1] http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/printmember/mar1int-1
So what to do with a billion Euros? Obviously, we shouldn't put everything in a single pot. Particularly not in one crazy pot. That's why people complain about Markram's ego trip and enabling politicians. If you got a certain amount of funding, diversify: fund a couple of cranks, sure, but 90% should go toward what's often called normal science where small steps add up to comparatively predictable progress.
(In Markram's/the HBP's defence: Ultimately, the project will yield a metric tonne of normal science, especially in terms of infrastructure etc. However, everybody will be disappointed at the end...)
Anybody responsible for science funding should be keenly aware that the machine they steer is much better at responding to obvious failures like Markram than silent failures that ulcer treatment was for decades.
Now maybe there is some extra physics that comes into play at scale (like some quantum-computery effect with human-size brains that induces conciousness) but maybe this would be detectable as small discrepancies in the small simulations (especially as they progress in size to e.g. mice).
For even the simplest mammals (let alone humans), surely the cost is >> X. So might it be a decent idea to give it a shot with C. elegans first? Because if we fail with C. elegans, we're almost guaranteed to fail with a mammal. And it's not immediately clear to me that we currently have the ability to do it successfully even for C. elegans.
I am definitely not a neuroscientist so maybe I am misguided. I'm also not wedded to C. elegans as being the ideal prototype, and I doubt anyone is (except possibly the people already studying C. elegans). But the first attempt should definitely be on something as simple as possible.
There's also http://www.openworm.org/
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Dalrymple_(computer_sc...
We are clueless. A lot of what is published is just neurobabble, even in 'serious' journals. As others have pointed out, we still don't even know how to simulate a brain of a tiny worm with 302 neurons. Talking about simulating billions of neurons is beyond fantasy, and funding such a projects is.. well.. not surprising from politicians, but that is another matter.
Similarly, a lot of scientists are researching themes like 'consciousness' and 'executive functions' and still don't know how to make a robot walk like a normal person on two feet. We should be concentrating on trying to understand the simple stuff - the reflex arc, muscle control, grasping, and pointing a finger toward something.
I am finishing up my undergraduate right now in psychology, and while I want to defend the work that is being done by cognitive psychologists on concepts at higher levels of abstraction (Many researchers working in more mathematical areas of psychology tend towards working on things like consciousness, perception, concepts and categorization. There are cool advances in it, but I won't go too much into it in this post. I guess I'm just trying to say that you end up working with constructs that have higher barriers of entry to communicating outside of groups of researchers who get excited about modeling and the perceptual measurement theory.) I digress with that though. The main reason I wanted to comment is that your comment on understanding things like pointing hit on one of my favorite areas of psychology that has tragically always been somewhat nitch, but provides a lot of interesting connections between different areas if you take the time to get into it. There is a thread in the field of psychology that does just this kind of research, termed sometimes ecological psychology. It is often referred to colloquially as Gibsonian psychology, termed after [JJ Gibson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_J._Gibson) who is seen as the father of the field(its practitioner's are known colloquially as Gibsonians).
I was lucky enough to take the Geoffrey Bingham's (who specializes reach to grasp behavior iirc) Perception/Action course a few years back, and found it immensely rewarding.* The primary text for the course was JJ Gibson's classic book "The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception". The philosophical foundations of gibsons theory of affordances is to take a realist approach to perception. (Avoiding the troubles that mind-body dualism imposes; taking a more Heidegerrian approach). The classic mantra of the field is ask not what is in you're mind, but what you're mind is in. I wish I had time to say more now, but I need to run here. But I'll leave you with a few snippets of what I took away from the course, and some links I think you'll enjoy, and can furnish more if you would be interested.
The Archival Gibson Video Series (Whoever assembled these had perfect choice in music)
[Reversibility and event perception](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GwVLny6Ymsk)
[Optical Transitions:Visible To Invisible](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qQLtIICXoE)
[Motion Paralax and Percieved Depth](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVSaWXqQh0w)
Disclaimer I haven't watched this video, but the idea that perception of throw-ability may explain size weight illusions is a surprising one.
[Geoff Bingham - Haptics: throwing and the size-weight illusion](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ud9JB4NYUvA)
* I really need to digitize those notes...
Btw: Awesome Arm.
Still, I'd much rather see $1B spent imperfectly on something important - a thousand times over - rather than a trillion plus on the F-35, or so many of the ways governments spend money.
That's easy to say with hindsight. No results from putting money into something doesn't mean you made the wrong choice. That might be the case here, but as a general statement it's really quite dangerously wrong.
That's only true from a cynically commercial standpoint. From a scientific standpoint, negative results are every bit as important as positive ones. As Edison said, "I have not failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that won't work."
(Which isn't to say that we shouldn't consider the likelihood of valuable results, positive or negative, in relation to the time, money, and effort spent, just that there are important considerations besides commercial payoff potential.)
It's cool that you have many calculations running in parallel on a super computer, and each calculation is a simplified model of a neuron, but how do you know when you've actually replicated a brain? A brain is more than a collection of neurons, they need to be connected and do something.
A grand project needs to be timed very carefully. Even the ones that actually work well will be obsolete by their completion unless they happen to occur in the right part of the technology cycle.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Brain_Project#Documentary
This is going to be very interesting.
This is a beautiful sentiment.
800 scientists: We Jelly JO! How come one asshole gets 1.3B euro for his project and can decide how to spend it? Lets collectively shit on him.
There is no substantive critique cited in this article, only scientists whining about management structure.