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Comment by grayhacker | Hacker News Reader

The procedural aspects of this sound good - multiple rings of security, compartmentalization of risk, etc. - but I have to wonder how well systems so dependent on the intelligence and intuition of individual screeners would work in North America.

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It wouldn't. How many planes is El Al actually flying? How many planes do the majors in the US fly? This idea does not scale. It puts society on the wrong end of the cost equation.

Also note that Shin Bet security levels require El Al to spend on the order of $100million/year to secure those 37 airplanes - and, when you are subjected to "Selective Screening" - you aren't dealing with the TSA and their seeming reluctance to actually _search_ you during a pat down.

[edit: I'd love to know what percentage of Muslims are subjected to "Selective Screening" on El Al flights. The TSA/United States can't get away with the same type of behavior that Israel can get away with. We have to treat everyone the same to avoid the taint of "Profiling"]

"The TSA/United States can't get away with the same type of behavior that Israel can get away with. We have to treat everyone the same to avoid the taint of "Profiling"]"

The TSA operating procedure manual specifies that ALL citizens of 12 countries (almost exclusively Muslim-populated ones) are automatically selected for secondary screening.

Even my American citizen friends with Arabic names get "random screening" the majority of times they fly.

For what it's worth, I don't think decorum is the problem with duplicating El Al for, say, UAL and AA. The problem is that we can't staff enough competent people to execute at El Al levels of sophistication against our passenger load. TSA screeners are close to the bottom of the law enforcement and homeland security food chain, and the people we need to do this job require more skills than the average metro police officer.

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