Thermodynamical cost of some interpretations of quantum theory
arxiv.org
arxiv.org
Input 1: authors check out (PRL, Nature pubs). Not a one-off crazy posting to arXiv.
Input 2: Unless this your field, I'd be surprised if you get much from the paper other than interpretation of quantum mechanics is still an active field and information theory / thermodynamics has an important role in that field.
Input 3: After a few reads, I don't like the phrasing the authors put on Type-II interpretations. They say "Another class sees quantum probabilities as not directly dealing with intrinsic properties of the world but with relational experiences between an observer and the world." Another way to say it may be that it's impossible to separate observation from the intrinsic properties of the world. That is, reality is tightly bound up with observation and trying to separate the two is artificial. But I'd be happy to hear what others think about it.
I think it is more parsimonious to say that there are no intrinsic properties of the world that are not relational, not that they are impossible to separate from observation. It defeats the purpose of interpretations like relational quantum mechanics to hold on to the concept of an intrinsic reality when the interpretation makes such a concept superfluous.
I would say that it is impossible to disentangle the intrinsic properties of the world from observations in the same way that going north of the North Pole is impossible.
Or to put it another way: observers are intrinsic to reality as well as the systems under observation, and any attempt to treat them separately will fail. But this is uninteresting, because any interpretation is going to have to acknowledge this at some level (as Bohr correctly pointed out quite a long time ago.)
Regardless, I think it's clear that assumption `(i)` is the one that breaks: the system affects the decision of what to measure. The stream of random bits will consume all the neg-entropy in the system, cause heat death, and thereby break whatever mechanism was doing the measuring (e.g. if it was you, then you would die).
[1] http://www.nature.com/news/cosmic-light-could-close-quantum-...
[1] http://arxiv.org/abs/1112.1811 - page 12
In order for Bell's theorem (and a lot of subsequent quantum theory) to work, we have to interpret causal and statistical independence as being one and the same. But the more one learns about the theoretical justification for this conflation, the shakier it seems. Bell, in particular, justified it by claiming that it was unscientific to assume that experimenters didn't have free will. Okay, sure.
Any universe where the assumption that experimental measurement settings are always already statistically correlated with the state of the system being measured (even if that correlation would have to have been established millennia ago) is fundamentally weird in certain ways - these kinds of theories are sometimes called 'conspiracy theories' as it sort of seems like all the information is there and nature is conspiring to hide it from us. But there's a whole branch of super-determinist interpretations of quantum mechanics motivated by the sense that this kind of weirdness is not as bad as the kind of weirdness we'd have to otherwise accept. This kind of work has been out of fashion for a while, but it seems to be gaining a certain amount of momentum in the last decade or so.
Regarding the context, the quote I'm thinking of comes from one of the essays in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, which is an enlightening read, both in terms of content and for its historical value. The issue, I think, is that the kind of 'conspiracy' implied by superdeterminist theories, wherein nature sort of guides our hand in picking certain experimental settings so as to hide information seems troubling to many scientists. See Zeilinger's quote at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism
Is this typical for science?