You're not irrational, you're just quantum probabilistic
phys.org
phys.org
There's been a lot of "normal" bayesian modeling in cognitive psych and it has problems with the examples they address. So the point isn't data modeling per se, it is better data modeling, which is often worth a look.
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9801041
So QM is probably a poor model for explaining human indecisiveness and irrationality. Much better is that it is simply the thing that evolution has come up with that can a) fit in our brains and b) yields proper results.
Up to now the models have mostly been a heap of heuristics but those produce models with lots of degrees of freedom that don't generalize well.
I wouldn't be surprised if it turned out that cognition relied on quantum phenomena as well.
0. http://www.nature.com/ncomms/2014/140109/ncomms4012/full/nco...
(https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=A+quantum+theoretical+e...)
He goes through the application of quantum probability, contrasts it with Komolgorov probability theory, and then walks through quite a few "anomalies" in cognitive psychology laying out specific models to deal with them.
The exposition of quantum vs. Komolgorov probability is clear and does not rely on specialized prior knowledge. The list of anomalies makes apparent the need for better modeling tools.
Last I've heard, probabilistic modelling of cognition - with resource-bounded processing and causal modelling in place of "pure" probability theory - has been a fairly successful research program. What advantage does quantum "complex" probability have over that, or over some generalizing to a measure theory with an arbitrary norm?
http://www.thedocc.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/J24.-BuseW...
So if you end up comparing an even-loosely-descriptive theory to a normative one, the descriptive theory will win, every time, no matter how far it is from true accuracy. That is, if you line up prospect theory, standard normative decision theory, and some new descriptive theory, the latter will definitely win in a model selection. But that doesn't tell us how the quantum descriptive theory compares to, for instance, the causal-probabilistic descriptive theory.
That said, if we find that cognition can be well described by some fairly clean math, we should take a hard look at "normative" models that say it should be different. Up to now the descriptions have mostly had to use a pile of heuristics that could be (handwavingly) justified as "cheaper". But this work suggests a very different picture.
First, there's no strong evidence that biological brains make use of quantum phenomena except insofar as those phenomena drive normal chemistry.
Second, if brains do make use of quantum phenomena in weird ways, the effect would not be visible at a level as abstract as decision making. Such processes operate at the level of hundreds of millions of neurons, at which point classical approximations are quite accurate. Any strange quantum phenomenon would operate at the level of single neurons, outside of which the quantum numbers grow so large as to approach classical statistics.
This quantum mysticism needs to stop. There are much better ways to explain psychological effects like indecision than a (horrifically tenuous) analogy to quantum physics.
That does not support your complaint.