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Comment by mcherm | Hacker News Reader

I will hang onto this and use it as an example of why it "government managed backdoor key escrow" for encryption algorithms is such a bad idea.

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Yep, it is the perfect explanation for why the Government can't be trusted with "master keys" of any kind.

like the "master keys" for the nuclear arsenal?

They are not master keys if they are the only keys and they only open the lock they were built for.

Exactly. This is only a problem if the locks were publicly available which they should be in case of insecure technologies like the clipper chip.

I guess the physical equivalent is a knox box as illustrated here https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_up...

Bringing up the protection of the nuclear arsenal only enforces the fact that an encryption "master key" controlled by the government isn't such a great idea:

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/launch-code-for-u...

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20427730/ns/us_news-military/t/air...

http://www.aol.com/article/2014/11/03/2-nuclear-commanders-f...

http://www.rt.com/usa/usaf-general-drunken-women-moscow-529/

You left out the worst incident I know of:

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/12/us/north-carolina-nuclear-...

The US was one arming switch away from nuking North Carolina in 1961. This and a bunch of other really scary nuclear-related accidents are covered in Command & Control: http://www.amazon.com/Command-Control-Damascus-Accident-Illu...

The master keys for the nuclear arsenal were "00000000" for much of the cold war.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/05/nuclear-missile-cod...

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