TSA Master Keys
schneier.com
schneier.com
In stark contrast with the requirement that TSA be able to open your luggage (unlocked or backdoored), if you declare a firearm in your checked luggage the TSA cannot - by law - have the means to open your [hard-shell] luggage, YOU must retain the key or combination and must be present to open it when inspected.
(Of course, traveling legally with a gun has its own litany of issues, but for those of us who are OK with the basic concept may find doing so helpful against TSA's security theater.)
Although the law requires guns to be carried in locked, hard-sided cases, baggage handlers have no problem getting into such luggage, he said. The other possibility, experts said, is that TSA screeners who X-ray or inspect bags by hand could be pocketing the guns. Source: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-08-14/news/060814020...
Yes, anything can be stolen (whole luggage even). Put in a real case, with a serious lock, which legally cannot be opened without you, and you've significantly improved the odds of seeing that camera (and "bodyguard" gun) again.
Just because improving the odds didn't reach 0.0 doesn't mean it's 1.0.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/nyregion/lawful-handguns-d...
Note that "packed securely" can have different meanings at different airports. There isn't a uniform standard or branding on cases that meet airline and TSA requirements for weapon transport. But you'll have the fewest problems with a Pelican that is fully locked.
At LAS they don't even do a TSA screen. They put a tag in he bag at gate and just use X-ray on the bags later. They will call you at the terminal over PA if there is an issue.
Also note that TSA allows you to carry ammunition loaded in a magazine, which may be in the same case as the firearm. I usually check a Glock 31 with three loaded magazines in the case.
Obviously they don't protect you from someone who simply steals your entire bag, to open it at leisure away from the airport. But something doesn't have to protect against every conceivable threat in order to be useful.
Locks on your luggage is like locks on your front door. A lock on a normal house door is easily defeated with a crow bar or a strong leg. But they're still useful to keep out people who are willing to use the door knob but not actually break down the door.
This requires no more effort or skill than opening an un-"locked" bag.
I had checks stolen from a carry-on bag at JFK, by a TSA employee, pretty much right under my nose. Some airports have had mafia-run theft rings operate for months or years before getting caught.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5mvvZl6pLI
edit: s/suitcase/zip-closed bag/
The zip tie idea is fine except that my checked bag is the only place I can put something capable of cutting one.
It seems that in either case, checked luggage is at risk of being tampered with, searched, or outright stolen and there is very little we can do about it (aside from filing a claim with the airline and hoping for the best).
>otherwise a seal provides a lot more value
Introduction to Tamper Evident Devices from datagram at defcon 19 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W07ZpEv9Sog is interesting to watch
I've occasionally sent a piece of luggage through, and found it re-zip-tied with a new tie, with a TSA love note inside.
Nothing is secure, really. I'm continually amazed that people want to see security as a binary thing.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpIJVWXsBBI
To counter this (and unauthorized use of a TSA key), wrap your bag in industrial cling-wrap plastic.
You should also go right to baggage claim when you land. Most airports don't have someone looking at the bag claim receipts, so thieves can walk right out with a bag.
In both cases, the problem is the same: the system makes a visible promise of security and has an easy silent failure mode. Getting rid of the TSA “safe” locks or locks at all on zippered bags would improve security by accurately communicating the level risk.
If you need to transport something valuable that you can't carry on, ship it instead, overnight if necessary. No, that may not be cheap, but if you're that concerned with security, it's probably worth it.
(Not that FedEx/UPS/etc. don't come with their own problems, but I've found them to be pretty reliable over time, and you can insure the item in question.)
If anything, this just made it easier for casual lazy people to get a set of images for keys they'll never make :)
I think at least two locks would be required, and depending on how many pins and possible positions there are, more might be needed in case of a collision.
http://www.instructables.com/id/Make-a-working-key-from-scra...
Who's really profiting there? Is it just for the employment of people that otherwise wouldn't have a job? Or are the majority of citizens there really made to feel more secure by having them? I'd have to say some defense contractor is getting a bit fatter off this.
Seems like a ridiculous waste of money.
"Michael Chertoff has been an advocate of enhanced technologies, such as full body scanners.[25] His lobbying firm Chertoff Group (founded 2009) represents manufacturers of the scanners.[26][27]"
"Michael Chertoff (born November 28, 1953) is an American attorney who was the second United States Secretary of Homeland Security under Presidents George W. Bush and (for one day) Barack Obama, and co-author of the USA PATRIOT Act."
It isn't just a defense contractor, it's the former head of the DHS who implemented these policies and gets kickbacks from body scanner use. He set up the nationwide deployment of the scanners, then profited directly. It's corruption to the extreme.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darleen_Druyun
[2] http://www.forbes.com/sites/judystone/2015/02/17/the-sham-of... - goes into more, but the relevant part is about 2/3 down. Search for "Rick Scott pushed".
For instance, try telling the average american that the TSA needs to be shut down.
They'll think that they're keeping us safe, the same way people think that police keep us safe, and will think that without obamacare we wouldn't have health insurance, in a few years.
The people paying for it (US citizens and those who travel into or through the US) would surely see it as a waste. But the people profiting don't, and the people profiting are the same people who make the laws mandating them.
I opt out of the naked scanners every time I fly. Just tell the TSA clown trying to herd you into the naked scanner the magic phrase "I'm opting out." After a 5 minute wait, some other clown will come over and molest you, and then you're free to go.
I do this as a little protest against a system I see as stupid and illegal. If everybody opted out, the system would get so backed up that they would have to change their policies. I'm doing my part, and I encourage you to do yours next time you fly. (Unless you're not white, in which case you should probably just keep your head down :-/ )
Any religion is as good as the other, and you're just going by what your religion's deity told you. Nothing wrong with that, as far as I can see.
Pre-TSA, we were wasting the same or more amount of money on private contractors of dubious quality. But you didn't really know how much, as the cost was spread across thousands of airline/airport authorities/municipal government combinations.
I would not be surprised if the TSA version of airport security cost 10x the previous version.
Speaking for Tasmania, there's a desolate looking guy on the Hobart bomb scanner device every time that flags me over. His face says it all, "I know this is a bullshit job, just submit and it will be over with quickly, I collect a paycheck, you feel bad for a little while."
Deleted comment
The outline: problem in government that can be solved -> contractor group identifies problem -> contractor group contacts their lobbyist -> lobbyist lobbies government at right points -> contractor group gets contract to solve problem for far more $ than the problem is worth (usually) -> lobbyist can now find another job for the contractors as soon as they identify another problem.
Ask qui bono, ruthlessly. Follow the money from branch to root. Do some research on where the money is ending up, and you'll find who set the process in motion via corruption.
On a side note, Americans will never feel safe because there is a pervasive circus of media and behavioral memes which encourage fearfulness and paranoia. Have you ever seen the nightly news? Have you ever talked with a mom? We could be sitting alone in sterile jail cells, and people would still worry that the jail cell being cold might give us pneumonia.
You start with critical keys that are closely held. Over time other parties express the need for access ("Okay, if you promise to be good"). Nothing bad happens (that anyone can prove...) so over time more entities are brought into the circle of trust. Eventually the dog-catcher has access to your stuff.
There's no way these keys haven't already broadly leaked (I mean, before these pictures).
The whole idea of a small set of physical keys and a large number of publically available locks is, of course, utter horse poop.
The logical extension of this "security" and "industry needs to meet law enforcement in the middle" to digital keys is terrifying. And I'm guessing it's how quite a few people think about it in the TSA and other organizations.
Forget about leaks for a second.
If a mechanical engineer can get their hands on 1,000 sample locks and keys (for instance: by simply buying them) and then imaging them, is it that difficult to reverse engineer the skeleton key system?
It requires access to one (non-master) key as well as a lock which is open-able by that key. It also requires being able to generate a modest number of new keys with a key cutter (however significantly fewer than brute forcing the entire space).
IIRC, the attack boils down to: - Start with the known non-master key - Hold all but one of the teeth constant, and try different values of that one tooth until you get a different working key. This other value must be the master key's value. - Repeat until you have the master value for each tooth.
If TSA locks work the same way as the locks described in this paper, a single lock/key seems sufficient to generate the master key.
They should setup a service where you checkin your luggage, they check it for drugs or illegal stuff, they seal it, and at arrival you get your suitcase with the guarantee that it had no drugs at checkin.
http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Bag-handler-theory-ov...
At the time, the case & defence theory was so high profile that Australian airports had a service to seal your luggage in layers of shrink-wrap before your overseas flight, so you could know if your luggage had been tampered with by baggage handlers and prevent it being "Schapelle'd":
https://www.choice.com.au/travel/on-holidays/luggage/article...
As for the TSA locks, the Prestolock TSA Search Alert locks come with a green/red indicator to show if the lock has been opened by a TSA key. Though the TSA tend to leave a notice in your bag as well saying it was opened for inspection.
It was claimed that she was the unwitting victim of a domestic airport transshipping smuggling ring, who would stuff drugs in unwitting passengers bags and pick them up at the other end. Her lawyer later admitted that this theory and the 'evidence' the defense presented around it was his invention, to the point where he was disbarred.
She claimed that she had never been involved with marijuana nor had anyone in her family. Photos and other evidence surfaced showing her smoking, and before and after her trial, family members including her mother were charged with drug offenses, including 'supply' offenses, not just possession.
Photos of her surfaced with known drug dealers and smugglers. The most damaging of these was with a drug smuggler. Schapelle claimed that the photo was from 'years ago' and that she had disavowed contact after learning of his involvement. The Indonesian prosecution showed that the photo was taken at the jail where she was being held pre-trial.
I'm not a smoker, but definitely pro-legalization. But her case was exactly that, full of conspiracy theories that had little to no backing in reality.
Baggage handler/TSA agent at airport #1 opens baggage, places drugs inside, calls baggage hander/TSA agent at airport #2 with luggage brand and traveler name.
When flight arrives, hander #2 intercepts baggage. At this point, they either take the whole suitcase, or remove the drugs and the traveler is none the wiser.
They can easily be defeated with a deep-drilled blank wrapped in aluminum foil.
1: http://www.amazon.com/Bell-Sports-7015777-CATALYST-U-Lock/dp...
No shit.
We're not talking about a bank vault here -- it's luggage. Does anyone, anywhere, have any expectation whatsoever that a luggage lock provides meaningful security? I think I opened my mom's luggage lock with my sister's hairpin when I was 6 years old, and I have zero lock picking skills.
The big impact is that one leak kills the security of all locks (of that type).
I don't think this would necessarily be the case when looking at (publicly) backdoored encryption. Here, you could have an individual backdoor key for each "lock". Of course, the mass storage of backdoor keys make a mass-leak also more probable.
Pahahaha. That sounds like something you'd find in an ARG puzzle, but this was a prison. Kinda curious how the other prisoner had jeweler's equipment in his cell, it seems like that could be pretty dangerous. Good behavior?
It’s also not uncommon for many criminals to be allowed to leave the prison and walk around in the surrounding area to go to stores, etc, unless they are a direct threat.
So, having this equip in the cell is not unusual.
Jail keys changed after TV lapse http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/5145026.stm
The existence of this organization proves that both Bush and Obama and the Democrats and Republican parties are corrupt and irrational... and more interested in their own power than in benefiting the country.
If someone happens to have questions about these keys, we don't physically have them. But we plan on making our own versions & finding the right blanks. If you think you can help, or want to know more, you can always reach out to myself or @Irongeek_ADC.
If you happen to know Solidworks & how to trace objects, I'd like to really get to know you.
Cheers :)
Edit: I just watched the YouTube video posted below. Looks like we're just dealing with a flawed system.
This method absolutely works.
My luggage is a very large pelican case.
> I'd imagine you need to check-in in a different area and not the front desk?
Yes, and at some airports you get your very own line (which is almost never busy). I've saved multiple hours at certain major airports because of the separate screening procedures/lines.
Most of the time, though, you'll just go to a normal desk, say "I need a firearms declaration," and they'll check you in as-normal, until your bag needs to be screened. At that point, you'll go to another area, unlock the bag for the TSA (if it alarms) and receive a hand-screening.
More info: http://deviating.net/firearms/packing/
An Airbus A380 uses the equivalent energy of 3l gasoline per passenger per 100km. This is a mileage of 80mpg.
Only rail is more efficient.
Even with busses, most transit authorities have lots of different sizes – from 10 people busses in rural areas at night, to bi-articulated busses for 300 people at rush hour in downtown areas.
If you always try to use the same vehicle, though, yes, you get the same mileage as an average car. You still save space on the roads, though.