Did Lawrence doubt the bomb?
blog.nuclearsecrecy.com
blog.nuclearsecrecy.com
The excellent Five Days in August (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691168431/) the author recommends comments how after Nagasaki there was quite a bit of discussion whether to use the 3rd bomb, which if I remember correctly was being constructed in Tinian at the time, for another strategic strike or to reserve it for tactical use in Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushuu projected to start in 3 months. Which all but MacArthur had realized that absent the liberal use of nuclear or chemical was not going to happen, the Japanese had reinforced it too well, and had built too many kamikazis.
Nobody knew if bombing Japan was going to end the war, including the Supreme War Council in Japan. War Minister Anami wanted to go on with the war after the first atomic bombing, saying the Allies couldn't have more than one bomb. After the second bomb, he signed a surrender document and committed ritual suicide. There was a big Army pro-war fight-to-the-end faction, which tried a last-minute coup attempt to prevent the surrender.[1]
[1] http://www.amazon.com/Japans-Longest-Pacific-Research-Societ...
Certainly it was a very conveniently timed shock, but unlike the bomb it wasn't a reason the Emperor cited for surrendering. And the threat the USSR represented to the home islands, especially Honshu, was limited, although I'll bet the way the Red Army tore into the IJA in Manchuria was convenient in helping to cow its hotheads.
I think the most we can say it that it might have been necessary, but it probably wasn't sufficient.
In Europe, all allied forced descended on Germany, and Europe the region was divided between the west and east, specifically the US/Marshallplan/NATO and the USSR/Molotovplan/Warschaupact.
Had the war ended in Japan the way it did in Europe, with the USSR playing a major role in the final battle and the inevitable Japanese peace process, Japan (and the region) may have been divided much like Europe was. Japan might not have become an ally of the US, might not have been part of the gigantic US economic motor in the post-war era that heavily relied on Europe and Japan as (economic) allies, and Japan may have ended up as some kind of North/South Korean divide but between the US/USSR instead of US/China.
The theory goes then, that the nuclear bomb hastened the process to swiftly force a Japanese surrender before the USSR could exercise its influence in the region.
As such under this theory, the nuclear bomb is seen as the beginning of the cold war, which is normally recognised to have begun two years later. The bomb ensured the US its first major exclusive ally, Japan, in the cold war.
I haven't studied it but it seems like a credible theory in that it's plausible. Whether this plausible type of reasoning actually played a role in the bombings is another story, one I haven't ever taken the time to explore.
In contrast, the notion that the USSR's declaration of war made the Japanese surrender strikes me as implausible. After all, the Japanese had been viciously decimated for many months, the nuclear bombs were dwarfed by the firebombings campaigns of all major cities over and over again, and it was well known that the Japanese's military capacity was reduced to virtually nothing, and that as a country with few natural resources and reliant on imports, it was bleeding dry after every single one of its logistics routes (air, land, sea) were completely cut off. Finally it had no air supremacy left and was defenceless to bombing. My point is, victory was impossible and defeat inevitably, the USSR declaration changed very little from the Japanese perspective. But it changed a lot for the American perspective, which is why it's plausible the US wanted to force surrender quickly.
Beyond that, the cold war was very much, perhaps most powerfully characterised, by constant shows of power. Demonstrating nuclear power as the first nation must have played a role in the US's claim to hegemony. Any doubts there may have been that the era of European supremacy was over, and that the US had become the world's superpower, must have instantly faded. It's the equivalent of China overtaking the US in GDP, building a base on mars, dominating at the olympics and showing unprecedented military power and weaponry. In that sense, too, a show of power with the bomb was perhaps the first action of the cold war.
Not even MacArthur, the only one who still was planning on carrying out Operation Olympic as conceived, believed that. He had ordered up 1/4 of the Purple Hearts thought necessary (perhaps for it and Operation Coronet, the invasion of Honshu), and we're still using those.
People who trusted our intelligence intercepts knew between the IJA reinforcements in Kyushu and the 8,000 ready kamikazes that the original concept was dead. Based on our apocalyptic invasion experiences culminating in the Battle of Okinawa, those who didn't know about the Manhattan Project were planning on liberal use of chemical weapons, those who did, using a handful of nukes.
My point is, victory was impossible and defeat inevitably the USSR declaration changed very little from the Japanese perspective. But it changed a lot for the American perspective, which is why it's plausible the US wanted to force surrender quickly.
This thesis fails because the USSR didn't do it until after we'd bombed Hiroshima, in fact, they started on the day we bombed Nagasaki (or a hour or so before that day; I haven't seen a timezone adjusted timeline). By then we'd learned how totally untrustworthy Stalin was, and of course his eyes were on the prize of Eastern Europe.
In fact, if anything, I would expect the causality ran the other way. Prior to the dramatic results of bombing Hiroshima, and certainly prior to Trinity 3 weeks earlier, I would expect that Stalin believed he had plenty of time to gain what he wanted in the east, but those brought the distinct possibility the war would be over immediately, as indeed happened.
As for the threat of a divided Japan, exactly whose navy would have deposited enough Red Army troops on the Home Islands for that to be a concern?
The fact they still had the capacity to fight to the last man and that this would be bloody is a truism that doesn't need to be stated. But my point is that they (1) had no capacity beyond their borders and (2) their defeat was inevitable. In that respect, the USSR's decision to go to war, too, changed nothing for them. That's my point. An anecdote about how a lot of purple hearts were printed because the end was expected to be bloody doesn't change that point. Of course it made Japan's case even more hopeless (in particular because the Soviet's would likely invade Manchuria, one of the remaining places for Japan to gain natural resources, although even those were effectively cut off as Japan's merchant fleet had been decimated).
For example the US Strategic Bombing Survey established by the secretary of war (1940-1945) established: > Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.
Eisenhower says: > During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.
And he was joined by other generals, e.g. McArthur. The guy in charge of the , LeMay, who of course famously firebombed Japan in a way much more destructive than the nuclear bombs (death tolls between 200k and 500k, and destroying nearly half of all built up areas of 66 cities) who opined he had committed war crimes and that he'd be tried as a war criminal had the US lost the war somehow, said
> The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.
Fleet admiral Nimitz said:
> The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan.
Fleet Admiral Leafy said: > The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons... The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.
The fact that the end of the war might've have involved more fighting and that some campaigns had been planned that would have been bloody (again, an invasion wasn't the only scenario accounted for, the nuclear bombs proved at the very least that), doesn't change the fact that Japan had in essence already been defeated, whether they'd surrendered or not, whether the last mile would be painful or not.
> In fact, if anything, I would expect the causality ran the other way.
Your statement just supports the idea I raised, which is that the US threw the bombs knowing the USSR would at some point shift its focus towards Japan. I'm not saying that the US decided within 24 hours 'oh, the USSR attacks Japan, never woulda imagined that, took us by complete surprise, let's quickly drop the bomb'. Of course not, and of course that wouldn't make sense as you stated given the first bomb was dropped before that. My point is that with the war in Europe roundly settled, the USSR would very likely at one point have looked to exert its influence south of its borders, the region of Japanese influence, the US knew this and in fact the US was aware that the USSR delayed surrender proposals to make itself ready to shift its forces to the east. Given the above statements by top-ranked military personnel it's sensible to say that Japan had already been defeated, was dependent on imports, had no merchant fleet and barely a naval fleet that couldn't be refueled anyway. Thus an atomic bomb wasn't required to defeat Japan, unless you were on a timeline because at some point the USSR would shift its attention. The fact the USSR did shift immediately after the first bomb was dropped proves exactly their interest in being there for the end and playing a role in the peace process and aftermath. And indeed the very fact the USSR had the ability to invade quite quickly (much quicker than the Japanese had expected the Americans to invade), perhaps even caused the US to choose targets that'd show maximum damage (outside of Tokyo which was ruled out for obvious reasons), as opposed to using multiple nuclear weapons 'for show'. After all, the US would have the third bomb ready later that month, and the 4th in August, and others following, and was not at threat by Japan. Given a few months they could've continued to bomb with impunity, drop nuclear weapons for show with impunity, block off Japan's trade with impunity, and be strengthened by their Soviet allies.
> As for the threat of a divided Japan, exactly whose navy would have deposited enough Red Army troops on the Home Islands for that to be a concern?
The same fleet that allowed the 16th Army (100k strong) invade Sakhalin, or the fleet that facilitated the invasion of the Kuril islands, or the planned Russian invasion of Hokkaido which never happened due to the surrender. Don't take it by the way as a divided Japan in terms of two different countries on a militarised border like say Korea, but rather one like a divided Europe, in which the USSR has half of the influence. Unlike in Europe however, the USSR didn't acquire as much influence in Japan and Japan turned into a very strong US/Western ally, and one can argue sensibly that the atomic bombs may have helped the US in that regard, and that in turn this may have inspired the US to use the bombs in spite of a resolution to the war that would've taken longer.
After the fact statements by non-Air Force flag officers? Probably in the context of nuclear weapons being perceived as making their services obsolete (a mistake that took the bloody Korean War to start correcting, but before that see e.g. The Revolt of the Admirals)?
As for Sakhalin, it was an invasion of the southern half of the island. The USSR used an amphibious landing of a rifle brigade and a marine battalion in the effort, that's not the same thing as landing 100K, and the rest of the islands the took were quite small. Could they have taken a fair amount, or maybe even all of Hokkaido? Very possibly, but this is not hardly the same sort of thing as occupying Eastern Europe. Today the island has 4% of the total Japanese population; due to it having 1/4th of the home islands' arable land, I'd assume it was larger in proportion back then, but compared to grabbing most of what was traditionally "Germany", with a very long land border, plus almost all of Eastern Europe (does Austria count as part of it)?
Anyway, your thesis rests on the assumption our end of WWII leadership, ridden as it was with Soviet agents, was so bloody minded they'd casually slaughter 10s of thousands of Japanese merely to decrease Soviet influence in East Asia.
An extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary proof when the simpler explanation works so well. That the two atomic bombs ended up saving even more Japanese lives, 250,000 civilian lives per month in the rest of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, and 10s of thousands of Allied military that would have been lost in the invasions.
The only debatable point I see here is that of unconditional surrender, which after WWI, after, as Tom Lehrer put it "We taught them a lesson in 1918. And they've hardly bothered us since then.", we were determined that we wouldn't go through another cycle. Which we accomplished; maybe Germany and/or Japan will once again threaten the world, but that's not in the foreseeable future.