Judge’s Ruling Offers Peek into Private Equity’s Secret World
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
In short, what is generally done (and also in this case) is that when you buy a company, you can have the company borrow money, and transfer that money to the PE owner. You can do this because you have good bank connections, and the company is a large going concern that is used to borrowing some money from its lenders. I couldn't just open a company tomorrow and fleece the bank by paying it all to myself.
Our corporate system grew out of the industrial revolution. There was a need to finance large undertakings in a way that wouldn't be ruinous if it went wrong. Gathering a bunch of money from investors wasn't a new idea (various "Indian" trading companies) but limited liability was seen as a necessity for risk taking. During the 1800s a bunch of western countries created the modern forms of the law (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limited_liability).
With the PE type model, you can take over a company, load it with debt, and transfer risk-free money to a parent fund. The company doesn't necessarily go bankrupt, but it's more likely if you take a lot of debt. If the company does well, great. You can take that account statement to your bank and... pile more debt on.
Most people who run a company will not behave like this. The idea is not to have a company that is constantly on the brink, but to pay out some dividends when it's safe to do so.
"Right at the core of the private equity business model is taking a company private, loading it up with debt that was used to finance the acquisition and using the interest deductions to shield the portfolio company from tax liability."
No, but companies that are taken over by PE firms are fairly special.
In any case, since the fund is forced to sell the company after a few years, they're still interested in LT value maximization.
Also, high debt levels aren't just a way of taking back some of the money the fund put in. Debt helps to fix the companies. The PE business model essentially focuses on fixing principal-agent issues (i.e. management working against the best interests of shareholders). Improved governance, high equity ownership by management, and high debt loads are how they do it. "Debt disciplines management" because it forces them to eliminate -NPV projects and increase cash flows.
Debt is what makes PE (and banks) money. That is why it exists.
You think Apax and TPG trashed Hellas because they were interested in making its management "more effective"? Is that why they redeemed 1 billion euros right after the purchase? To reward themselves for all the debt-management value they brought to the company and its employees?
They sold the company for 3.4b in 2007.
Did this happen because they made its management less effective? Do you think people who spend 3.4b to buy a company are unsophisticated investors?
Dividend recaps (as they're called in PE jargon) are frequently being used by entrepreneurs and/or owners of stable businesses who don't necessarily want to exit but want extra (personal) liquidity.
Like anything, it's a tool that can generate great rewards when used properly. Waiting for profits to roll in over many years can be inefficient (from a wealth building PoV) when, for example, the stock market is booming now (but won't be in 3-5 years).
It's not because not many people know about this, or use it, that it's a bad idea to use it. PE levels might sometimes be a bit excessive, but it's still a good way to unlock some of your wealth.
A bust-out can take many forms, but the basic idea is that control of a reputable company can be leveraged into an unjustifiable quantity of cash, which then disappears along with the perpetrator.
For example, a business might order more than the usual amount of stock from suppliers on credit, take out a commercial loan to cover expansion, and run a huge sale - even below cost - to pull in cash. Then the money and the owner disappear, leaving the business with debt to the suppliers, debt to the bank, and no cash.
On an individual scale, the same thing can be done with fraudulent credit accounts: establish a record of repayment, get a big advance, go. Identity theft is useful, since you can use someone else's credit-worthiness.
That appears to be equivalent to what's going on in PE.
That may be more typical (I don't know), but in this case at least, according to the article, Hellas had no prior debt.
http://www.plainsite.org/dockets/2lf62q01i/new-york-southern...
Related case:
http://www.plainsite.org/dockets/2lf6dcjz7/new-york-southern...
I'm pretty sure the court order discussed in the article (which is never specified) is this one, Document 188 from the first link:
http://www.plainsite.org/dockets/download.html?id=215714507&...
For an excellent example of best practice look at what Blackstone have done with the Hilton Group, Wolfskin, Merlin Entertainments ( owner of Legoland, Madame Tussaud's, London Eye ), the Bujagali Hydropower Project in Uganda or the Moser Baer Projects in India.
Yet, these big PE firms seem to come out ahead. Certainly their principles do. On the other hand, when big companies falter, there are the bystanders: the working people, clients of the business, the community, and other non-equity-holding stakeholders. None of these people seem to stand to gain much no matter who wins the game of thrones in the boardroom. And it's not as though these people will just frictionlessly proceed on to some alternative in the market.
For example: a real estate business needs to use a lot more debt than a software company.
The debt with the lowest levels of interest tends to be traditional bank debt. If the company goes under, they are first in line to recover any losses. The more debt involved in a deal, the riskier it gets.
If you fund a $100m deal with $40m in debt, and $60m in equity, that's fine. That's usually low risk if it's a healthy company.
Now imagine the same deal, $80m debt and $20m in equity. Traditional banks might only give you a loan for $50m. The remaining $30m you will need to get from other investors, who will be further in line to recover any losses (meaning they will charge a higher rate of interest).
Why do banks love big deals? Easy: these deals generate a lot of profit. On a $100m loan, they'll be making $4-6m a year.
Usually the risk level is acceptable for them, since they're first in line when the company gets liquidated.