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Comment by ubernostrum | Hacker News Reader

The smart thing to do, if you want to set up an effective TSA-like organization, is go to Israel, the UK, and other places which have a history of significant terrorism and which have developed effective or mostly-effective responses. Study what they do, learn what they've learned (since often they've learned it the hard way), then come back and use it as a basis for your own general counter-terrorism plan.

The way the TSA is actually doing things, however, is simply to ask "what did the last terrorist do? OK, ban that." Which doesn't stop the last guy, since he already did it, and won't stop the next guy, since he's going to do something else.

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> The way the TSA is actually doing things, however, is simply to ask "what did the last terrorist do? OK, ban that."

Though what he did was walk onto a plane with a block of semtex. They should try addressing that before restricting in-flight entertainment and toilet breaks.

I actually caught a flight back from Schiphol to Heathrow last week. Heathrow's security on the flight there was annoyingly thorough as usual (shoes off, belts off, laptops out, liquids in a clear bag with 100ml limit... none of which would have helped this case!). The Dutch security was different: hand luggage through the scanner, no special treatment for laptops, liquids or shoes - much more agreeable. Then they put you through a "security scan", one of these new millimetre wave scanners that are supposed to detect items strapped to the body - like drugs and guns. I've been wondering did Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab have the PETN strapped in his underpants, and the fancy new security scan failed to pick it up? Or was it in his bag, where the X-ray didn't see it?

This is pure arse-covering. The problem in this case is that Homeland Security received a tip-off from the terrorist's father telling them he was planning to blow up their plane, which they decided to ignore. Their solution is to treat the traveling public like a kindergarten class, no standing, no getting something from your bag, etc. What's next, banning people from talking to each other incase they're collaborating?

It is true that terrorists rarely attack planes in Israel. There they blow up coffee shops and restaurants and buses. A successful TSA just means that the threat will be targeted somewhere else.

If we're going to claim that an ineffective TSA is a "feature," then let's at least have an _efficiently_ ineffective one.

I'm from the uk and believe me, we do much the same thig as the TSA. Indeed sometimes we just do exactly the same thing just a few months after :-)

I've been to LHR and I'm going to partially disagree with this. The people that work at ATL, ORD, LAX, LGA, and IAD are morons compared to the people that work security at LHR, or FRA for that matter.

TSOs are very often lowest-rung idiots.

Ah, well those that implement the rules are a different matter.

But I know the policy here is pretty similar to the TSA.

I agree though; the UK staff are usually more friendly/sane.

Wow. In my experience LHR security is among the worst (as in most annoying) I've experienced Europe. If they are far above the people at US airports I feel sorry for anyone having to fly in the US. For what it's worth I've found the Swiss and Dutch to be the best, followed by the Germans.

I wonder if we do that. We have officer exchange programs with UK, Pakistan, probably Israel and many others, for military cross-pollination. Seems crazy if we don't do that for TSA.

The TSA is just a couple hundred suits, anyway. Their representatives at airports are just subcontractor rentacops...

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