What theoretical economists do is not 'nonsense' but can become nonsense when it naively forms the rationale for real-world policy.
What theoretical economists do is not 'nonsense' but can become nonsense when it naively forms the rationale for real-world policy.
If there is a convincing empirical economic study that widely contradicts a theoretical consensus---yes, that evidence should be preferred. But that is not often the case, and otherwise the theoretical argument is simply the best argument there is.
What drives me bonkers, though, is the people who dismiss the math and its conclusions as being 'meaningless', but then what they substitute is not superior empirical arguments of their own, but their own emotional sentiments and undisciplined intuitions (typically decorated by cherry-picked historical observations).
In that case, the "theoretical argument is simply the best argument" is wrong; we should study economic history and human behavior rigorously and let that inform our policy. Theory can serve as a useful model when it is validated by some sort of observation and data -- but even when we cannot perform controlled studies there is not a knock-down argument that "theory" must be our best guess.
I agree that a person's interpretation of economics is very likely to be influenced by their idea of how the world should work; but this is more a problem of our characteristic lack of critical self-reflection. And of course, we should have cogent arguments for our interpretation of economics, ideally rooted in objective evidence.