I think Eli and I are caught in what Wittgenstein might call a "language game." We seem to be using the same word but we're really meaning two different things. It'd be like if I thought basketball was a game involving kicking a ball into a net (soccer) and Eli thought it was a game involving throwing a ball into a net (basketball). While in that case we do have one objective definition of basketball, we don't necessarily have one universally accepted definition for "rationality."
I'm kind of reaching my limit here in terms of knowledge of philosophy; I've perhaps confused things by framing my descriptions using two contradictory definitions of rationality: that of the Enlightenment idea of rational (which I critique) vs St. Maximos the Confessor's idea of rational (which I advocate). I think that Eli is arguing from a Kantian sense, in terms of actions being rational up to a subjective idea of an ultimate good. Luckily for us, I've found a paper that discusses these three topics and will hopefully clear up the miscommunication we've had: http://www.academia.edu/10973797/A_Byzantine_Critique_of_Enl...
Edit: I initially said that Eli and I are perhaps in agreement, but assuming he's arguing from the Kantian sense then we aren't.
Well certainly. But by that standard, we really have no need for "divine irrationality", nor any need to insult the everyday rationality of real people.