I also believe there are reporting oddities in the role too, but I can't find the reference to it anymore.
The result is that same as China, the difference is who's paying the person's salary.
Edit [information below]:
[1] (13) Carriers shall comply with the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), see 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.20000 et seq. Page 5 of 6 1.20000 et seq.
[2] (14) Every carrier must designate an agent for service in the District of Columbia. See 47 U.S.C. § 413, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.47(h), 64.1195.
[3] https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-15-348A1.pd...
Not that ominous, just normal legal intercept. The US has had this requirement for a long time.
[0] https://insidersurveillance.com/calea-solutions-should-you-b...
[1] http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/LI-3GPP...
I expect that the intent is different, although I don't know US law. The Chinese intent is to (forcibly?) prevent unwanted communication. I doubt that is the intent of the US law.
CALEA intercepts are implemented through automated systems, the judge signs a warrant, it's entered into a computer and the wiretaps are done automatically, with the traffic routed to the requesting agency's systems.
In China, they probably noticed that they don't have a legal intercept facility built in, and don't want to spend the time to negotiate with all of the interested parties. So, they put a person on site.
The threat and the outcome is the same. If you don't provide legal intercept, you're going to get locked up.
For an example of what level of access these systems provide, a Greek carrier was hacked through theirs - the hacker(s) turned it on and used it to listen in on the Prime Minister's phone calls[1].
I'm not saying that the Chinese are doing the right thing, just that it's largely equivalent to what happens here.
[1] http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_...
The enforcement that goes with the surveillance is much less intrusive, almost invisible, but that doesn't mean we should ignore it.
[1] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/10/government-wiretap_...
The government can make sure that the private sector information and communication is secure against nation states and industrial espionage while also using the partnership and the access it provides to further its surveillance efforts, even its efforts against its own citizens.