Shut up and calculate (2007)
arxiv.org
arxiv.org
This approach rubs some people the wrong way, either because it's seen as a failure of imagination on the part of physicists to look at the bigger questions, or because it drifts close to the discredited logical positivism of the mid-20th century. Those are valid complaints, but I think it can also be seen as humility on the part of physicists, and an understanding that this is outside their field of expertise. "Science" is a fundamentally empirical exercise; if you're doing thinking without empiricism, it might still be valuable thinking, but it isn't science. "Shut up and calculate" is shorthand for, "Because these questions are not empirical, our tools and methods we have as scientists are not capable of addressing them." It's acknowledging that their powers are limited.
(I do think it would be nice if more physicists thought about it anyway, because in their abscence the void has been filled with woo by a bunch of New Age cranks, but that's not a moral obligation on their part)
I'm not sure I agree with you that "instrumentalism" is an adequate description of the position of Tegmark outlines. Instead of neglecting to assign an ontological status to anything, Tegmark appears to be assigning an ontological status to the mathematical structures themselves.
Which appears to me similar to rejecting the idea of an universe that just somehow came into existence or existed forever and introducing a god as the source of the universe but still leaving you behind with the same questions as before but now attached to the god instead of the universe.
And I personally don't really buy into the idea of mathematical structures existing independent of humans or the universe or whatnot anyway. Humans bring mathematical structures into existence, they postulate the axioms and explore the consequences. That pieces of the universe are isomorphic to this or that mathematical structure and therefore show similar properties and behaviors is either accidentally or because a mathematical structure was explicitly designed to mimic certain aspects of the universe, at least as far as I am concerned.
The BSM-SG model gives a very logical explanation how galaxies come to be and the high order matter we can measure (proton/neutrons/electrons/positrons).
It does not give you an answer tho, where the 2 types of fundamental particles come from, but their pure existence in mass quantities is enough for a galaxy to be born, or in our case, many many galaxies.
I'm having a hard time understanding this criticism. What use do we have for the concept of "dinosaur" other than as a means of predicting future discoveries and building a predictive theoretical model for our environment?
The instrumentalist attitude, conversely, is to refuse to assign any meaning to things beyond their predictive power. I suppose you could say that one identifies "what is" with "what use do we have", so in a sense your question presupposes an instrumentalist approach.
Once you saw this analysis of the QM wave function the hole building should collapse for you anyway or you should go into a different topic, but not science... To be honest, I got very skeptical about much in science and especially physics...
I agree that physical theories aim to describe how it works.
But I disagree that it follows that our physical reality has a mathematical structure. My objections are:
- There is no compelling reason to think that "purely abstract" mathematics any less anthropocentric than human language;
- Even if mathematics transcends humanity, there is no compelling reason to think that there is a single overarching mathematical structure of the universe, despite being able to predict the outcomes of our interactions to greater and greater accuracy as our physical theories develop.
It may be that Tegmark addresses these points in his "full strength" version, but given the way he glosses over these hidden assumptions in this paper, I'm not inclined to dig in and find out.
Indeed, it's not the only productive line of thinking in physics.
I'm basically with Tegmark. For one thing, what has physics ever come up with but equations, and improved equations to replace those, and so on? Everything so far has been math.
So, going forward, either everything in physics will always be rooted in math, or else some "non-math stuff" has to be discovered. (The very idea of "non math stuff" being at the root of reality seems absurd.) What kind of thing would that be? I think if we discover the ultimate equations then that's all there will be: those equations, and mysterious constants embedded in them that just are. The only explanation for those constants will be the anthropic principle: if those constants were different, we wouldn't be here to contemplate why they are, and in some other universe there are beings completely different from us also wondering why their constants and equations are they way they are.)
This might be a mere detail to some but to me it is a sign that physics is complex in all kinds of ways, and can't really be described as "choosing the right equations". Even if you think that this is what physics is fundamentally, I think you would have to admit that it wasn't possible to describe what the meaning of "equation" was before qft was developed, and the same may be true about future theories that unify the standard model and gravity.
Observations of nature and rational explanation of those in terms of old but also new concepts. Equations are just one of technical artifacts to help us think in a precise way. If we had computers sooner, there might have been physics without differential equations.
I think this is a false dichotomy:
> ...either everything in physics will always be rooted in math, or else some "non-math stuff" has to be discovered.
I can imagine a plethora of other possibilities. For example, there may be nothing "at the root " of reality, no ultimate equations. We might get better and better at predicting and manipulating the universe around us, but never close down on some ultimate truth.
The real dilemma of quantum theory is how to reconcile this macroscopic world with the world described by quantum theory. Personally I don't think many worlds approaches make sense because they don't have an adequate description of probability.
reality is exactly the opposite, everything has a form, mass, movement,...